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1 Introduction
A central assumption in public nance is that agents optimize fully with respect to taxes.
For example, Ramseys (1927) seminal analysis of optimal commodity taxation assumes that
agents respond to tax changes in the same way that they respond to price changes. Models of
optimal income taxation assume that agents choose labor supply and consumption optimally
irrespective of the complexity of the tax schedule they face (e.g. Mirrlees 1971, Atkinson
and Stiglitz 1976). Similar assumptions are implicit in positive analyses of taxation and
empirical studies of behavioral responses to taxation. In practice, income tax schedules
are typically highly non-linear, benet-tax linkages for social insurance programs are opaque
(e.g. social security taxes and benets), and taxes on commodities vary and are often not
directly displayed in posted prices (sales taxes, hotel city taxes, vehicle excise fees). Classic
results on tax incidence and e¢ ciency costs (e.g. Harberger 1964) rely on full optimization
with respect to such tax policies.
In the empirical component of this paper, we investigate whether individuals optimize
fully with respect to taxes by analyzing the e¤ect of salience on behavioral responses
to commodity taxation. We dene the salience of a tax in terms of the simplicity of
calculating the gross-of-tax price of a good.1 Specically, we test whether a commodity tax
has a larger e¤ect on demand if it is included in the posted price that customers see when
shopping (and hence is more salient). In Gabaix and Laibsons (2006) terminology, this
analysis can be interpreted as a test of whether commodity taxes are shrouded attributes.
We use two complementary empirical strategies: (1) an experiment in a grocery store and
(2) an observational study of the e¤ect of alcohol taxes on alcohol consumption.
The experiment was implemented in collaboration with a major grocery chain at a su-
permarket over a three-week period in early 2006. In this store, prices posted on the shelf
exclude sales tax of 7.375 percent. If the good is subject to sales tax, it is added to the
bill only at the register, as in most other retail stores in the United States.2 Our inter-
1To be precise, we say that a tax policy ta is more salient than a tax policy tb if calculating the
gross-of-tax-ta price of a good requires less computation than calculating the gross-of-tax-tb price.
2The sales tax a¤ects relative prices because it does not apply to all goods. Approximately 40% of
expenditure is subject to sales tax in the United States. Since food is typically exempt, the fraction of items
subject to sales tax in grocery stores is much lower.
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vention was to post tags showing the tax-inclusive price below the original pre-tax price tag
for all products in three taxable groups (cosmetics, hair care accessories, and deodorants),
thereby increasing the salience of the sales tax. We analyze the e¤ect of this intervention
on demand using a di¤erences-in-di¤erences research design. Using scanner data, we nd
that quantity sold and total revenue in the treated group of products fell by about 8 percent
during the intervention relative to two control groupsother products in the same aisle
of the treatment store that were not tagged and products in two other stores in the same
chain in nearby cities. The null hypothesis that posting tax-inclusive prices has no e¤ect on
demand is rejected using both t-tests and non-parametric permutation tests. To interpret
the magnitude of the treatment e¤ect, we compare it with the price elasticity of demand for
these categories, which is in the range of 1 to 1.5. Hence, showing the tax-inclusive price
reduced demand by nearly the same amount as a 7.375 percent price increase. This nding
suggests that the vast majority of customers do not normally take the sales tax on these
products into account.
A concern with the experiment is that posting 750 new tags may have reduced demand
because of a Hawthorne e¤ect or a short-run violation of norms. This issue motivates
our second empirical strategy, which compares the e¤ect of price changes with tax changes
using observational data over a longer horizon. To implement this test, we focus on alcohol
consumption, because alcohol is subject to two state-level taxes in the U.S.: an excise tax
that is included in the posted price and a sales tax that is added at the register (and hence
less salient). Exploiting state-level changes in these two tax rates between 1970 and 2003
coupled with annual data on total alcohol consumption by state, we nd that increases in the
excise tax reduce alcohol consumption by an order of magnitude more than similar increases
in the sales tax. A simple calibration shows that the magnitude of the di¤erence in the
elasticity estimates cannot be explained purely by the fact that the sales tax applies to a
broader base, especially since food and non-alcoholic beverages are exempt from sales tax in
most states. The di¤erence in elasticities persists over time, indicating that sales and excise
taxes induce di¤erent behavioral responses even in the long run.
There are two potential explanations for the nding that consumers under-react to taxes
that are not included in posted prices. One is that customers are uninformed about the
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sales tax rate or which goods are subject to sales tax. An alternative hypothesis is that
salience matters: the customers know what is taxed, but choose to focus on the posted
price when shopping. To distinguish between these competing hypotheses, we surveyed
customers entering the grocery store about their knowledge of sales taxes. The median
individual correctly reported the tax status of 7 out of the 8 products on the survey, and
reported the average sales tax rate within 0.5 percentage points of the true rate. Since most
individuals are well informed about taxes when their attention is drawn to the subject, we
conclude that they must choose not to compute tax-inclusive prices when shopping.
This empirical nding motivates the second portion of the paper, which focuses on de-
veloping a theoretical model that can explain the importance of tax salience while providing
a tractable framework for analyzing the welfare consequences of taxation. We propose a
simple bounded rationality model in which agents face a small cognitive cost of computing
tax-inclusive prices. Small cognitive costs can lead agents to ignore a large range of taxes
because the utility gain from computing the tax-inclusive price is often quite small. For
example, when the tax rate is 10 percent, an individual with quasilinear utility gains only $4
by computing and optimizing with respect to the tax-inclusive price for an item on which he
spends $1,000 and has a price elasticity of 1. Intuitively, since agents are near an optimum
to begin with, the gain from reoptimizing relative to the true tax rate is second-order an
application of the envelope theorem, as in Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985).
Viewed from this perspective, it is perhaps unsurprising that individuals with limited time
or attention choose not to compute tax-inclusive prices for small goods such as cosmetics
and alcohol. In addition to matching this evidence, the model also helps explain several
stylized facts about behavioral responses to taxation that pose problems for existing models.
Even though individual welfare may be minimally a¤ected by ignoring certain taxes, the
same taxes can have large impacts on social welfare and tax revenue. Consider a 10 percent
tax increase that is implemented to raise revenue in a market without externalities. This tax
increase raises a signicant amount of revenue regardless of whether the agent reoptimizes
his behavior, and could create substantial deadweight burden because of the scal externality
that the agent imposes on the government by changing his behavior. To quantify the e¤ects
of taxes on social welfare, we develop empirically implementable, Harberger-type formulas
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for the incidence and e¢ ciency costs of taxation. In our model, the deadweight loss of
taxation is determined by two factors beyond the compensated price elasticity of demand:
(1) the magnitude of distortionary income e¤ects (budget allocation errors) that arise
because agents do not optimize relative to true tax-inclusive prices and (2) the e¤ect of the
tax rate on the fraction of individuals who pay attention to taxes. The incidence of taxes
on consumers depends on the fraction of agents who compute tax inclusive prices and the
fundamentalprice elasticity of demand rather than the tax elasticity.
Because of these new factors, the e¢ ciency cost and incidence of tax policies can di¤er
substantially from predictions based on existing formulas. For example, a tax increase can
have a substantial e¢ ciency cost even when demand for the taxed good does not change
by distorting consumption allocations for inattentive individuals. Another implication is
that incidence depends on whether the tax is levied on consumers or rms, violating the
classic tax neutrality result in competitive markets. More generally, the theoretical analysis
indicates that prevailing views about the social welfare consequences of a wide range of tax
policies could be a¤ected if bounded-rationality and salience e¤ects are taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
Section 3 presents a simple two-type model as an organizing framework for our empirical
analysis. Section 4 discusses the experiment, section 5 presents the evidence on alcohol
sales, and section 6 presents the survey evidence. In section 7, we develop the model of
boundedly-rational agents and show how it can explain our empirical ndings as well as
other stylized facts. Section 8 analyzes the e¢ ciency cost and incidence of taxation in this
framework. Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our work builds on and relates to several strands of the literature in behavioral economics,
macroeconomics, and public nance. First, empirical studies have documented the impor-
tance of salience and limited attention in a variety of economic contexts: up-front appli-
ance costs vs. subsequent electricity costs (Hausman and Joskow 1982); real vs. nominal
prices (Shar, Diamond, and Tversky 1997); internet price search engines (Ellison and Elli-
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son 2004); prices vs. shipping fees (Hossain and Morgan 2005); nancial markets (Barber,
Odean and Zheng 2005; DellaVigna and Pollet 2005); and the pass-through of manufacturer
rebates for car purchases (Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettlemeyer 2006). Similarly, studies in
marketing have shown that the partitioning of prices into base pricesand additional fees
or into monthly payments vs. total payments has real e¤ects on demand (e.g. Gourville
1998, Morwitz et al. 1998). See DellaVigna (2007) for a detailed review of this literature.
Salience has received less attention in the public nance literature, and as a result its
normative implications have not been fully explored. A small set of studies has examined
whether individuals understand marginal income tax rates. Brown (1968) and Fujii and
Hawley (1988) nd that individuals self-reported marginal income tax rate often di¤ers from
the marginal tax rate implied by their demographic and income characteristics. In contrast,
Rosen (1976) nds that the cross-sectional correlation between marginal tax rates and work
hours and wage rates and work hours is similar in a survey of married women, suggesting that
there is limited tax illusion. de Bartolome (1995) shows using a lab experiment that many
MBA students confuse the average rate with the marginal rate when making $1 investments
in a taxable or non-taxable project. More recently, Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) and
Feldman and Katuscak (2006) present evidence that individualslabor supply responds to
average income tax rates rather than marginal tax rates using variation in the child tax credit.
In a separate line of research, McCa¤ery and Baron (2006) document that the framing and
presentation of alternative tax policy choices has signicant e¤ects on individualsrankings
of hypothetical policies when surveyed. Our empirical analysis contributes to this literature
by using credibly exogenous variation to test whether the salience of commodity taxes a¤ects
behavioral responses in the eld.
To analyze the implications of our empirical results for tax policy, we construct a model of
taxation with inattentive agents that builds on the bounded rationality literature pioneered
by Simon (1955). The concept underlying models of bounded rationality is that agents
face a cost of processing information and therefore rationally use simplifying heuristics to
solve complex problems (see e.g., Conlisk (1988), Conlisk (1996), Gabaix et al. (2006)).
This logic has been applied most widely in the macroeconomics literature. The seminal
work of Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985) showed that failing to re-optimize
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in response to shocks generates second-order losses for agents, but has rst-order e¤ects on
the macroeconomy. More recently, Mullainathan (2002), Sims (2003), Reis (2006), and
Mackowiac and Weiderholt (2006) develop models of boundedly rational and inattentive
consumers, and show that they can explain puzzles in aggregate consumption and pricing
dynamics. Ellison and Ellison (2004) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) study equilibrium in
models where individuals face cognitive constraints and rms have technologies to obfuscate
or shroud attributes to raise prots. A key result of these models is that individuals may
remain uninformed about shrouded (hidden) attributes in equilibrium because no market for
debiasing will emerge. While previous studies have focused on individual and rm behavior,
our theoretical contribution is to explore the implications of bounded rationality and limited
attention for social welfare.
In this respect, our study contributes to an emerging literature on behavioral public
nance. One strand of this literature has adopted a paternalistic approach, assuming that
agents maximize a utility function that systematically di¤ers from the planners objective
function. An early example of this approach is Feldsteins (1985) classic analysis of opti-
mal social security with myopic agents, where the social planner has a lower discount rate
than individuals. More recent examples include the analysis of cigarette consumption and
addiction when preferences are time-inconsistent (Gruber and Koszegi 2001); optimal taxes
on sin goods (ODonoghue and Rabin 2006); and optimal retirement savings policies for
hyperbolic agents (Amador et al. 2006). An alternative approach the one we adopt here
is to assume instead that the individual and social planner agree on the objective function
to be optimized, but that the individual faces certain cognitive constraints in achieving his
true optimum when faced with a complex tax system. This approach is less developed in
the existing literature. Sheshinski (2002) provides a parsimonious model of bounded ratio-
nality and shows that even small departures from full rationality may make it desirable for
a benevolent social planner to restrict choices. Bernheim and Rangel (2007) take a more
agnostic approach, and propose a method for constructing bounds on welfare gains based
purely on observed choices even when there is no underlying utility representation available
for those choices. Our theoretical analysis of the e¢ ciency cost of taxation can be viewed
as a special case of Bernheim and Rangels approach, where we assume that choices when
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taxes are salient reveal an agents true ranking.
Finally, the idea that individuals focus on salient features of tax systems also has political
economy implications for how governments set taxes. For example, a politician who wants to
maximize his chance of re-election may try to create a wedge between the burden perceived
by taxpayers and the actual burden (Krishna and Slemrod 2003). The empirical relevance
of this idea is explored by Finkelstein (2007), who nds that state toll authorities raise tolls
more frequently after introducing electronic toll collection systems, which make tolls less
salient to drivers.
3 Empirical Framework
We begin by presenting an organizing framework for our empirical analysis using a simple
model of consumption behavior in which some agents are inattentive to tax-inclusive prices.3
Consider a static model where an agent with wealth Z has an additively separable quasilinear
utility function over two goods, x and y, of the following form:
U(x; y) = a
x1 b
1  b + y
where b > 0 determines the price elasticity of x. Normalize the price of y to 1, and let p
denote the price of x. Assume that y is untaxed and x is subject to an ad valorem sales tax
tS. The total price of x is pt = p(1+ tS). The tax tS is not included in the posted price that
consumers see when deciding how much of x to purchase. Since consumers must compute
the tax-inclusive price pt but can observe the pre-tax price p without any computation, we
will say that the tax tS is less salientthan the pre-tax price p.
Suppose the economy has two types of agents, who di¤er in their attention to the sales
tax. The rst type is a fully-optimizing consumer who uses the full tax-inclusive price when
making his consumption decision, as in the neoclassical model. This type maximizes U(x; y)
and chooses x(p; t) = (p(1+t
S)
a
) 1=b. The second type is a consumer who is inattentive, and
3In this section, we simply assume that some agents are inattentive, without modelling the source of
this inattention. In section 7, we show that the inattentiveness assumed here can be derived as a rational
consequence of cognitive constraints.
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focuses solely on the pre-tax price p when making his decision. He sets consumption of x
as xp(p; t) = ( p
a
) 1=b.
Let  denote the fraction of agents who optimize relative to the true tax-inclusive price.
Then aggregate demand for x in an economy with a unit mass of agents is given by
bx(p; tS; ) = x + (1  )xp = (1  )(p
a
) 1=b + (
p(1 + tS)
a
) 1=b
= (
p
a
) 1=b[1   + (1 + tS) 1=b]
Recognizing that tS is small, we simplify this expression using the rst-order Taylor approx-
imation k  1   + k for k  1 to obtain
bx(p; t; )  (p
a
) 1=b(1 + tS) =b.
Taking logs yields the demand specication that underlies our empirical analysis:
log bx(p; t; ) = +  log p+  log(1 + tS) (1)
where  = 1
b
log a and  =  1
b
. The parameter of interest is  the fraction of individuals
in the population who take the sales tax into account when making consumption decisions.
The null hypothesis in canonical models of taxation is that  = 1: all agents optimize relative
to tax-inclusive prices. Our goals are to test this hypothesis and provide an estimate of
the value of  associated with the sales tax for certain goods in the U.S.4 We use two
independent empirical strategies.
Strategy 1: Manipulate Tax Salience. Our rst approach to estimating  is to make the
sales tax as salient as the pre-tax price by posting the tax-inclusive price pt on the shelf.
When tax-inclusive prices are posted, all individuals presumably optimize relative to the
4In practice, there could be other typesin the population who use di¤erent heuristics, e.g. adding 10%
to posted prices to account for taxes. In this case, our estimate of  cannot be interpreted as the fraction
of full optimizers in the population. Nevertheless, our hypothesis test remains valid: an estimated  < 1
constitutes a rejection of a model where all individuals optimize fully.
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tax-inclusive price (i.e.,  = 1). Hence, the e¤ect of posting pt on demand is
log bx(p; tS; 1)  log bx(p; tS; ) = (1  ) log(1 + tS)
Dening the price elasticity of demand as "x;p =  @ log bx@ log p =  , it follows that
(1  ) = ="x;p (2)
where  =   log bx(p;t;1) log bx(p;t;)
log(1+t)
denotes the normalized tax visibilitye¤ect. The parameter
 can be interpreted as the (absolute value of the) change in demand caused by making a
1 percent sales tax as salient as the price. The intuition underlying (2) is straightforward:
the e¤ect of posting tax-inclusive prices on demand relative to the e¤ect of a price increase
of corresponding size identies the fraction of individuals who ignore the sales tax. If all
consumers normally optimize relative to the sales tax, posting pt should have no e¤ect on
demand ( = 0 ,  = 1), since it is redundant information. If all consumers ignore the
sales tax, posting pt should reduce demand by "x;p log(1 + t), implying  = "x;p and  = 0.
Strategy 2: Manipulate Tax Rate. An alternative approach to estimating  is to exploit
variation in tS and compare the price elasticity of demand with the tax elasticity of demand,
as in Rosen (1976). In particular,
 =
@ log bx
@ log(1 + tS)
= =
@ log bx
@ log(1 + tS)
=
@ log bx
@ log p
=
"x;1+tS
"x;p
Under the null hypothesis that salience does not matter, prices and taxes should a¤ect
demand equally: "x;1+tS = "x;p ,  = 1.
In the next section, we implement strategy 1 using a eld experiment at a grocery store.
In section 5, we implement strategy 2 using observational data on alcohol consumption.
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4 Evidence from an Experiment at a Grocery Store
4.1 Research Design
We conducted an experiment showing tax-inclusive prices at a large grocery store in a suburb
in Northern California. The store belongs to a grocery chain which has nearly 2,000 stores
in the U.S. Within the store, approximately 30 percent of the products on the shelves are
subject to the local sales tax rate of 7.375 percent. When applicable, the sales tax (rounded
to the nearest cent) is added at the register. Price tags on the shelf display only pre-tax
prices, as in the upper half of the tag shown in Exhibit 1.
We estimate the e¤ect of posting tax-inclusive prices on demand using a di¤erences-
in-di¤erences research design. We use this design because randomization of tax-inclusive
prices was infeasible, given limitations in the scope and duration of the experiment. In
particular, the grocery chains managers expected that showing tax-inclusive prices would
reduce sales. In order to limit revenue losses, we were asked to restrict the intervention
to three categories that were not sales leading categories, and limit the duration of the
intervention to three weeks. The three product groups were chosen in collaboration with the
managers based on this requirement and two additional criteria: (1) having relatively high
prices, so that the dollar amount of the sales tax is non-trivial; and (2) belonging to what
the store terms impulse purchase categoriesgoods that exhibit high price elasticities 
so that the demand response to the intervention would be detectable. This led us to run
the experiment on three product groups cosmetics, hair care accessories, and deodorants
over a three week period.5
We posted tax-inclusive prices for products in these product group beginning on February
22, 2006 and ending on March 15, 2006. Exhibit 1 shows how the price tags were altered.
The original tags, which show pre-tax prices, were left untouched on the shelf. A tag showing
the tax-inclusive price was attached directly below this tag for each product. The added
5In principle, the treatment of showing tax-inclusive price tags could have been randomized at the indi-
vidual product level. However, the concern that such an intervention could be confusing and potentially
deceptive (e.g. suggesting that one lipstick is taxed and another is not) dissuaded us from pursuing this
strategy. We therefore tagged complete product groups, so that any direct substitute for a treated product
would also be treated.
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tag stated Total Price: $p + Sales Tax = $pt,where p denotes the pre-tax price (repeating
the information in the original tag) and pt denotes the tax-inclusive price. The original
pre-tax price was repeated on the new tag to avoid giving the impression that the price of
the product had been increased. For the same reason, the fonts used for p, pt, and the words
Sales Taxexactly matched the font used by the store for the original price.6 Additional
details on experiment implementation are given in the appendix.
To estimate the e¤ect of the intervention, we compare sales in the treatmentgroup of
products whose tags were modied with three controlgroups that serve as counterfactuals.
Dene the treatment group as products that belong to the cosmetics, hair care accessories,
or deodorants product groups in the treatment store during the three week treatment period.
The treatment categories were in two adjacent aisles, and take up space equivalent to roughly
half an aisle in the store. The rst control group is a set of control products in the same
aisles as the treatment products, for which we did not change tags. These products include
similar (taxable) toiletries such as toothpaste, skin care, and shaving products; see Appendix
Table 1 for the full list. The second control group is a pair of control stores in nearby cities
whose customers have similar demographic characteristics to the treatment store. These
control stores were chosen based on a minimum distance criterion using characteristics listed
in Table 1, which include variables such as the size of the store and the mean income of the
city where the store is located. The third control group consists of the months prior to the
experiment.
Using these control groups, we implement a standard di¤erence-in-di¤erence methodol-
ogy, testing whether sales of the treated products fell during the intervention relative to
control products and control stores. As in other di¤erence-in-di¤erence analyses, the identi-
cation assumption underlying our estimate is a common trendscondition (Meyer 1995),
which in this case requires that sales would have evolved identically in the treatment and
control groups absent the intervention. We discuss and evaluate this assumption below in
the context of our empirical estimates.
6An important concern with this intervention is that the tags themselves may have created confusion,
thereby reducing demand for reasons unrelated to the information that was provided. While we cannot rule
out such a Hawthorne e¤ect,we show below that most individuals know the parameters of the sales tax
almost exactly, a nding which suggests that most customers were likely to have understood the tags.
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4.2 Data and Summary Statistics
We use scanner data from the treatment store and the two control stores, spanning week 1
of 2005 to week 15 of 2006. Price and quantity data for individual products are observed
by promotional week weeks beginning on Wednesdays and ending on Tuesdays  in
correspondence with the grocery chains pricing cycle. Details on the dataset and sample
construction are given in the appendix.
Summary measures of store characteristics are displayed in Table 1. The three stores
are large (roughly 37,000 sq. feet) and have been open for about 15 years. The cities in
which these stores are located are higher income than the U.S. average: the median household
income in 2000 was around $55,000, compared to $42,000 for the nation as a whole.
Table 2 presents category and product level summary statistics, broken down by treat-
ment and control product groups within each store. The overlap between the treatment and
control groups is generally quite good. Within the treatment group, there are 13 product
categories(e.g. lipsticks, eye cosmetics, roll-on deodorants, body spray deodorants). In
these categories, the treatment store sold an average of 25.08 items and earned $97.85 of rev-
enue per week over the sample period (column 1 of Table 2). The treatment products thus
account for approximately $1,300 of revenue per week as a whole. Average weekly quantity
sold per category is similar for the control products, but products in these categories are
somewhat more expensive on average (column 2). The rst control store is very similar to
the treatment store, but the second control store has higher volume in all categories (columns
5-6).
We analyze the data at the category-by-store level (so that there are 13+95=108 obser-
vations per store per week), summing quantity sold and revenue over the individual products
within categories in each store. We aggregate to the category level rather than analyzing
the data at the product level for two reasons: (1) the intervention was done at the category
level and (2) we cannot distinguish products that were on the shelf but did not sell (true
zeros) from products that were not on the shelf (missing data). Analyzing the data at the
category level circumvents this problem because there are relatively few category-weeks with
missing data (4.7 percent of all observations). Since all the categories always existed in all
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stores throughout the sample period, we believe that these observations are true zeros, and
code them as such.7
4.3 Results
Comparison of Means. We begin our analysis with a simple cross-tabulation of mean quantity
sold in Table 3. The upper panel of the table shows data for the treatment store. The
data is divided into four cells by time (pre-experiment vs. the intervention period) and by
product group (treated categories vs. control categories in the same store). Each cell shows
the mean quantity sold for the group labeled on the axes, along with the standard error and
the number of observations. All standard errors reported in this and subsequent tables in
this section are clustered by week to adjust for correlation of errors across products.
The mean quantity sold in the treatment categories fell by an average of 1.30 units
per week during the experimental period relative to the pre-period baseline. Meanwhile,
quantity sold in the control categories within the treatment store went up by 0.84 units.
Hence, sales fell in the treatment categories relative to the control categories by 2.14 units
on average, with a standard error of 0.68. This change of DDTS =  2:14 units is the
within treatment storeDD estimate of the impact of posting tax-inclusive prices. The
identication assumption necessary for consistency of DDTS as an estimate of the e¤ect of
showing tax-inclusive prices is that the time trend in sales of the treatment products and
control products would have been similar absent the intervention.
One natural way of evaluating the validity of this identication assumption is to compare
the change in sales of treatment and control products in the control stores, where no inter-
vention took place. The lower panel of Table 3 presents such a comparison by showing mean
sales for the same sets of products and time periods in the two control stores. In the control
stores, sales of treatment products increased by a (statistically insignicant) DDCS = 0:06
units relative to sales of control products. The fact that DDCS is not signicantly di¤er-
ent from zero suggests that sales of the treatment and control products would in fact have
7If we impute quantity as zero for items that sold in both an earlier week and subsequent week, we nd
that 31 percent of products sell in a given week. We have analyzed data at the product level using this
imputation procedure, and obtained results similar to those below.
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evolved similarly in the treatment store had the intervention not taken place.
Putting together the upper and lower panels of Table 3, one can construct a triple di¤er-
ence(DDD) estimate of the e¤ect of the intervention, as in Gruber (1994). This estimate
is DDD = DDTS  DDCS =  2:20. This estimate is statistically signicant with p < 0:01,
rejecting full-optimization ( = 1). Note that both within-store and within-product time
trends are di¤erenced out in the DDD. The DDD estimate is therefore immune to both
store-specic shocks such as a transitory increase in customer tra¢ c and product-specic
shocks  such as uctuations in demand for certain goods. Hence, the identication as-
sumption for consistency of the DDD estimate is relatively weak: it requires that there was
no contemporaneous shock during our experimental intervention that di¤erentially a¤ected
sales only of the treatment products in the treatment store. In view of the planned, exoge-
nous nature of the intervention, we believe that this condition is likely to be satised, and
hence that the DDD provides a consistent estimate of the treatment e¤ect.
To gauge the magnitude of the estimated e¤ect, we use the framework developed in
section 3. The mean quantity sold per category in the sample is 29.01 units. The estimate
of -2.20 therefore implies that quantity sold fell by 7.6 percent. Given the sales tax rate
of 7.375 percent, the normalized tax visibility e¤ect is  = 1:03. As we discuss below, the
estimated price elasticity of demand at the category level is "x;p = 1:59. Since 1  = ="x;p,
the point estimate of  is 0:35. Note, however, that the hypothesis that  = 0 is not rejected
given the standard error on the estimate of . The data are consistent with the hypothesis
that none of the customers normally base their decisions on the tax-inclusive price in these
product groups.
Regression Estimates. We evaluate the robustness of the DDD estimate by estimating a
series of regression models with various covariate sets and sample specications in Tables 4
and 5. Let the outcome of interest (e.g. quantity, log quantity, revenue) be denoted by y.
Let the variables TS (treatment store), TC (treatment categories), and TT (treatment time)
denote indicators for whether an observation is in the experimental store, categories, and
time, respectively. Let X denote a vector of additional covariates. We estimate variants of
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the following linear model, which generalizes the DDD strategy used in Table 3:
y = + 1TT + 2TS + 3TC + 1TT  TC + 2TT  TS + 3TS  TC
+TT  TC  TS + X + " (3)
In this specication, the  coe¢ cients capture changes in sales over time (1), time-invariant
di¤erence between the experimental store and control stores (2), and time-invariant di¤er-
ences between the treated categories and control categories (3). The second-level inter-
actions control for changes in sales in the treatment categories over time (1), changes in
sales in the treatment store over time (2), and time-invariant characteristics of the treat-
ment category in the treatment store (3). Finally, the third-level interaction () captures
the treatment e¤ect of the experiment, and equals the DDD estimate when no additional
controls are included.
As a reference, specication 1 of Table 4 replicates the DDD estimate in Table 3 by
estimating (3) for quantity sold. Specication 2 replicates 1, controlling for the mean price
of the products in each category using a quadratic specication and including category, week,
and store xed e¤ects.8 The estimate on the treatment coe¢ cient is essentially unchanged
with the price control, which is unsurprising given that there were no unusual price changes
during our intervention period. Specication 3 shows that the intervention led to a signicant
reduction in revenue (pricequantity) from the treatment products relative to the control
groups.
In specications 4 and 5, we estimate analogous models in logs instead of levels. In
these specications, we weight each observation by the mean revenue over time by category
by store, placing greater weight on the larger categories as in the levels regressions. An
advantage of the log specication is that it may be a better model for comparisons across
categories with di¤erent baseline quantities. A disadvantage of the logs specication is that
it forces us to omit observations that have zero quantity sold. The logs specications yield
slightly larger estimates than the levels models: a decline in quantity sold of 10.1 percent
8The mean price is dened as the average price of the products in each category in the relevant week,
weighted by quantity sold over the sample period. The xed weights eliminate any mechanical relationship
between uctuations in quantity sold and the average price variable. See the appendix for details.
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and revenue of 12.3 percent. In the log quantity model, the estimated category-level price
elasticity i.e., the e¤ect of a 1 percent increase in the prices of all goods within a category 
is "d;p = 1:59: This elasticity is identied by exploiting the variation in average category-level
prices across weeks within the stores. The estimate is consistent with the estimates of Hoch
et al. (1995), who estimate a full product-level demand system and obtain category-level
price elasticities of 1 to 1.5 for similar products using scanner data from the same grocery
chain.9
The data suggest that revenue per category fell slightly more than quantity sold per
category. We explore this issue further in specication 6, by estimating the e¤ect of the
intervention on the average price of the purchased products within a category (i.e. revenue
divided by quantity sold in each category). While imprecisely estimated, the coe¢ cient
estimate implies that the average price of items purchased fell by about $0.10 (1.9 percent)
during the treatment period. One interpretation of this result is that individuals in the
market for a more expensive product were more likely to buy nothing at all because the
tax levied on more expensive products is larger in dollar terms. Another interpretation is
that individuals substituted toward cheaper products within the treatment categories. We
cannot distinguish between these alternative hypotheses with the available data.
Placebo Tests and Robustness Checks. As noted by Bertrand et al. (2002), a concern
in DD analysis is that serial correlation can induce trends that lead to overrejection of the
null hypothesis of no e¤ect. To address this concern, we rst check for unusual patterns in
demand in the weeks immediately before and after the experiment. We replicate specication
1 in Table 4, and include indicator variables for the three week period before the intervention
began (BT ) and the three week period after the intervention ended (AT ). We also include
second- and third-level interactions of BT and AT with the TC and TS variables, as for the
TT variable in (3). Column 1 of Table 5 reports estimates of the third-level interactions (e.g.
BT  TS  TC) for the periods before, during, and after the experiment. Consistent with
the results in Table 4, quantity sold in the treatment group is estimated to have changed
9This similarity of estimates is reassuring because the simple approach of aggregating over the categories
and regressing mean quantity on mean price need not in general produce a consistent estimate of the category-
level price elasticity.
16
by  =  2:27 units during the intervention. The corresponding placeboestimates for the
periods before and after the treatment are close to zero.10 These results indicate that the
fall in demand coincides precisely with the intervention period, supporting the identication
strategy.
Building on the logic underlying this specication check, we implement a non-parametric
permutation test for  = 0, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2002). We rst choose a
placebotriplet consisting of a store, three week time period, and a randomly selected set
of 13 product categories (excluding the triplet that coincides exactly with the true treatment,
i.e. TT  TC  TS = 1). We then estimate (3), pretending that the placebo triplet is the
treatment triplet. Let bP denote the estimate of  from this regression. We repeat this
procedure for all permutations of stores and contiguous three week periods and 25 di¤erent
randomly selected groups of 13 categories, obtaining 63  3  25 = 4; 725 estimates of bP .
The fbPg values yield an empirical distribution of placebo e¤ects in the sample. Let G
represent the cdf for this distribution. The statistic G() gives a p-value for the hypothesis
that  = 0. Intuitively, if the experiment had a signicant e¤ect on demand, we would
expect the estimated coe¢ cient to be in the lower tail of estimated e¤ects when we replicate
the analysis for placebo triplets.11 Since this permutation test does not make parametric
assumptions about the error structure, it does not su¤er from the overrejection bias of the
t-test in the presence of serial correlation.
Figures 1a-b illustrate the results of the permutation test by plotting the empirical dis-
tribution of placebo e¤ects G for log quantity and log revenue. The placebo estimates used
to construct Figures 1a and 1b are obtained by replicating the specications in column 4
and 5 of Table 4, respectively. The vertical line in each gure denotes the corresponding
treatment e¤ect estimate reported in Table 4. For log quantity, G() = 0:07 and for log
revenue, G() = 0:04. Although these p-values are larger than those obtained using the
t-tests (presumably because the permutation test has less power), they conrm that the
intervention led to an unusually low level of demand. It is also reassuring that the G dis-
10We discuss why demand returns to pre-experiment levels after the tags were removed in section 6.
11This test can be viewed as an extension of Fishers (1922) exact test for an association between two
binary variables. See Rosenbaum (1986) for more on permutation tests.
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tributions are approximately Normal, supporting the parametric assumption underlying the
t-tests above. Placebo tests for the other specications in Table 4 yield similar results.
As an alternative method of probing the robustness of our identication strategy, we
consider subsets of the large set of controlsacross time, categories, and stores. In column
2 of Table 5, we restrict the sample to the treatment product categories, and compare across
time and stores. In column 3, we restrict the sample to the treatment store, and compare
across time and categories. Reassuringly, both of these DD estimates are similar to the DDD
estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4. Restricting the control time period to the three months
immediately before the intervention or limiting the control categories to nearby products also
does not a¤ect the estimates signicantly (not reported).
Supplementary Tests. Some studies in the marketing literature (e.g., Anderson and
Simester 2003) nd that demand drops discontinuously when prices cross integer thresh-
olds (such as $3.99 vs. $4.01), and that retailers respond to this by setting prices that end in
9to maximize prots. Indeed, the retailer we study sets most productspre-tax prices just
below the integer threshold an observation that in itself supports our claim that individ-
uals focus on the pre-tax rather than the tax-inclusive price, since the tax-inclusive price is
often above the integer threshold. It is interesting to ask whether demand fell more for the
products whose price crossed the integer threshold once taxes were included (e.g. $3.99 +
Sales Tax = $4.28). We estimated a model analogous to (3) at the product level, including
an interaction of the treatment variable with a dummy for the product price crossing the
integer threshold. We nd no evidence that demand fell more for the products that crossed
the threshold, though the interaction e¤ect is imprecisely estimated.
We also tested whether the intervention in the treatment categories had spillovere¤ects
onto the nearby control categories by estimating (3) with separate indicators for control
categories that were physically adjacent to the treatment categories vs. not adjacent to
them. We nd no signicant di¤erence in demand during the treatment period across the
adjacent and more distant control categories within the treatment store, indicating that the
e¤ect of the intervention was conned to the products for which tax-inclusive prices were
posted.
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5 Evidence from Observational Data on Alcohol Sales
5.1 Research Design
We turn now to our second empirical test: comparing the e¤ect of increases in posted prices
and taxes on demand. We implement this strategy by focusing on alcohol consumption.
Alcohol is subject to two state-level taxes in most states: (1) an excise tax that is levied at
the wholesale level and is included in the price posted on the shelf or restaurant menu and
(2) a sales tax, which is added at the register (except in Hawaii, which we exclude). The
total price of alcohol is therefore pt = p0(1 + tE)(1 + tS) where p0 is the pre-tax price, tE is
the excise tax, and tS is the sales tax. Since the excise tax creates variation in the posted
price, it is more salient than the sales tax.
We compare the e¤ects of state-level changes in the two taxes on alcohol consumption,
using an estimating equation based on the demand specication in (1):
log bx(tE; tS; ) = +  log(1 + tE) +  log(1 + tS) (4)
where  = @ log bx
@ log 1+tE
is the gross-of-excise-tax elasticity and  = @ log bx
@ log 1+tS
is the gross-of-
sales-tax elasticity.12 We estimate (4) in rst-di¤erences because both the tax rates and
alcohol consumption are highly autocorrelated series. Letting t index time (years) and j
index states, dene the di¤erence operator z = zjt   zj;t 1. Introducing a set of other
demand-shifters Xjt and an error term "jt to capture idiosyncratic state-specic demand
shocks, we obtain the following estimating equation by rst-di¤erencing (4):
 log bxjt = 0 +  log(1 + tEjt) +  log(1 + tSjt) +Xjt+ "jt (5)
We estimate variants of (5) using OLS, and test the hypothesis that the gross-of-excise-tax
and gross-of-sales-tax elasticities are equal, as would be predicted in the absence of salience
e¤ects ( = 1). The identication assumption is that the changes in sales and excise taxes
12If tax increases are passed through fully to the consumer ( @p
@tE
= 1),  can be interpreted as the price
elasticity of demand. Irrespective of the incidence of taxes, the traditional model predicts that the two taxes
should a¤ect demand equally ( = 1).
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are uncorrelated with state-specic shocks to alcohol consumption. We assess the validity
of this assumption below.
An important simplication made in the test proposed above is the assumption that
both the excise tax and sales tax apply only to alcohol (and not the composite commodity y
that represents all other consumption). In reality, the sales tax applies to a broader set of
goods than alcohol: based on statistics on sales tax revenues and tax rates, approximately
40 percent of consumption is subject to sales taxation on average.13 Hence, a 1 percent
increase in tS changes the relative price of x and y less than a 1 percent increase in tE.
After presenting the baseline estimates, we present some additional evidence and calibrations
which indicate that the degree of bias from this issue is unlikely to explain the the estimated
di¤erence between the two elasticities.
5.2 Data and Summary Statistics
Tax rates on alcohol vary across beer, wine, and spirits. In the interest of space, we present
results for beer, which accounts for the largest share of alcohol consumption in the U.S. A
parallel analysis using data on wine taxes and consumption for a smaller subset of years
yields similar results.14 We use data on aggregate annual beer consumption by state from
the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (2006) from 1970-2003. These data
are compiled from administrative state tax records, and are more precise than comparable
data from surveys because they reect total consumption in each state.
We obtain data on beer excise tax rates and sales tax rates and revenues by state from the
Brewers Almanac (various years), World Tax Database (2006), and other sources.15 The
state sales tax is an ad valorem tax (proportional to price), while the excise tax is typically
13In 2004, sales tax revenues were 2.1% of personal consumption expenditures (PCE). The average (state
income-weighted) sales tax rate was 5.3 percent. Hence the tax base is approximately 40 percent of PCE.
14A potential concern with focusing on one type of alcohol is that tax changes on that type may induce
substitution to other types of alcohol. In practice, however, changes in excise tax rates on the three types
are highly correlated. For example, the correlation coe¢ cient of changes in beer and wine tax rates is 0.94,
and in 85.5 percent of the instances in which a state changes its beer excise tax, it also changes its wine
excise tax rate. We show below that there is no evidence of substitution from beer to other types of alcohol
when beer excise tax rates are changed.
15We exclude West Virginia from our analysis because of problems with the sales tax rate series described
in the appendix. Including WV magnies the di¤erence between the excise and sales tax elasticities.
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a specic tax (specied as dollars per unit of beer). We convert the excise tax rate into
percentage units by dividing the beer excise tax per case in year 2000 dollars by the average
cost of a case of beer in the United States in the year 2000.16 Details on the data sources
and construction of tax rates are given in the appendix.
Table 6 lists summary statistics for the pooled dataset. Between 1970 and 2003, mean
per capita consumption of beer is 23 gallons per year, equivalent to roughly 240 cans. The
average state excise tax rate is 6.4 percent of the average price, which the mean sales tax
rate is 4.3 percent. The excise tax rate varies signicantly more than the sales tax rate:
the standard deviation of excise tax rates is 3 times that of sales tax rates. The nominal
value of the excise tax is updated infrequently, so excise tax rates have fallen as a percentage
of price over time. In contrast, sales tax rates have increased secularly over time. Since
identication from these secular changes may be contaminated by time trends in alcohol
consumption, we identify the elasticities from di¤erential changes in tax rates across states
by including year xed e¤ects in all regressions.
5.3 Results
We begin with a simple graphical analysis to illustrate the relationship between alcohol
consumption and taxes in Figures 2a and 2b. These gures plot annual state-level changes in
log beer consumption per capita against log changes in the gross-of-excise-tax price  log(1+
tE) and the gross-of-sales-tax price  log(1 + tS). To construct Figure 2a, we rst round
each state excise tax change to the nearest tenth of a percent (0.1%). We then compute
the mean change in log beer consumption for observations with the same rounded excise
tax change. Finally, we plot the mean consumption change against the rounded excise tax
rates, superimposing a best-t line on the points as a visual aid. Figure 2b is constructed
analogously, rounding sales tax changes to the nearest 0.1%. To make the range of changes
in the excise tax comparable to the smaller range of changes in the sales tax, we restrict the
range of the tax changes to :02 log points. Figure 2a shows that there is a sharp negative
relationship between changes in the beer excise tax and beer consumption. Figure 2b shows
16We normalize by the average price in the nation because each states price is endogenous to its tax rate.
21
that the relationship between changes in beer consumption and changes in the sales tax rate
is considerably weaker.
To quantify the magnitude of the di¤erence in the excise and sales tax elasticities, Table
7 presents estimates of the model for the state-level growth rate of alcohol consumption in
(5). In this and all subsequent tables, we adjust for potential serial correlation in errors by
clustering the standard errors by state. Column 1 reports estimates of a baseline model that
includes only year xed e¤ects and log state population as covariates. In this specication,
a 1 percent increase in the gross-of-excise-tax price is estimated to reduce beer consumption
by 0.87 percent ("x;1+tE = 0:87).17 In contrast, a 1 percent increase in the gross-of-sales-tax
price is estimated to reduce beer consumption by 0.20 percent ("x;1+tS = 0:20). The null
hypothesis that the excise and sales tax elasticities are equal is rejected with p = 0:05.
Columns 2-4 evaluate the robustness of these estimates to controls for factors that may
be correlated with the tax changes. One concern is that sales tax changes are correlated with
the business cycle. In column 2, we control for the state-level business cycle by including
state per capita income and the state unemployment rate as covariates. In column 3,
we include in addition the lags of these variables. Introducing these controls reduces the
estimated sales tax coe¢ cient, and as a result the null hypothesis of equal elasticities is
rejected with p = 0:01. The sales tax e¤ect is smaller because sales taxes are sometimes
raised during budgetary shortfalls that occur in recessions. Since alcohol is a normal good
(as indicated by the coe¢ cients on per capita income and unemployment rate), failing to
control for the business cycle biases the correlation between alcohol consumption and sales
tax changes upward in magnitude. Hence, the endogeneity of sales tax rate appears to work
against rejecting the null hypothesis that "x;1+tE = "x;1+tS .18
Another concern is that excise tax increases are sometimes associated with contempora-
neous changes in alcohol regulations, particularly e¤orts to reduce drunk driving or underage
17This elasticity estimate should not be confused with the elasticity of beer consumption with respect to
the excise tax rate ("x;tE ) that is often reported in empirical studies of beer demand. The latter elasticity
is much smaller because of the di¤erence in units (log(1 + tE)  tE vs. log(tE)). For example, Cook,
Osterman, and Sloan (2005) nd that a $0.01 increase in the beer tax per ounce of ethanol reduces beer
consumption by 1.9 percent. This translates into a gross-of-tax price elasticity of 1.26 at the sample mean.
18Endogeneity of excise taxes is also likely to work against nding a di¤erence in the elasticities: if policy-
makers tend to raise alcohol excise taxes when alcohol consumption is rising, our estimate of "x;1+tE will be
biased downward in magnitude.
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drinking. We evaluate this concern using data on four measures of regulations: the legal
drinking age, the blood alcohol content limit, implementation of stricter drunk driving regu-
lations for youths, and introduction of administrative license revocation laws.19 To separate
the e¤ect of tax changes from changes in regulations, we control for the change in the legal
drinking age (in years) and separate indicator variables for a shift toward stricter regulations
in each of the other three measures in a state-year pair in column 4. The coe¢ cient on the
excise tax rate does not change signicantly because regulation changes have modest e¤ects
on total beer consumption; on average, beer consumption falls by only 0.5 percent when one
of the four regulations is tightened.
Robustness Checks. In Table 8, we assess the robustness of the results to additional
changes in specication. First, note that the sales tax variable used in the previous table
excluded changes in local taxes. If localities lower taxes to o¤set increases in state rates,
changes in the state sales tax may overstate the true change in the combined tax rate.
Column 1 of Table 8 replicates column 4 of Table 7 incorporating changes in local sales
taxes, which are imputed from data on local tax revenues as described in the appendix. In
this specication, the excise tax coe¢ cient falls modestly, while the estimate of the sales tax
coe¢ cient is positive and statistically insignicant. The hypothesis that the two coe¢ cients
are equal is still rejected.
A concern in our identication strategy for the excise tax e¤ect is that trends in tax rates
may be correlated with changes in social norms, which directly inuence alcohol consumption.
For example, rising acceptance of alcohol consumption in historically conservative regions
such as the South may have led to both a reduction in the excise tax as a percentage of price
and an increase in alcohol consumption. To assess whether such trends lead to signicant
bias, we include region xed e¤ects in column 2 of Table 8. The coe¢ cient on the excise
rate remains substantially larger than the coe¢ cient on the sales tax, suggesting that our
results are not spuriously generated by region-specic trends.
As an alternative approach to disentangling time trends from the e¤ect of the tax, we
focus on legislated policy changes in excise tax rates. There are two sources of variation
identifying the excise tax coe¢ cient. The rst is policy changes in the nominal tax rate,
19We are grateful to Christopher Carpenter, Je¤ Miron, and Lina Tetelbaum for sharing this data.
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which produce sharp jumps in tax rates. The second is the gradual erosion of the nominal
value of the tax by ination, which creates di¤erential changes in excise tax rates across
states because they have di¤erent initial tax rates.20 To test whether the two sources of
variation yield similar results, we isolate the e¤ect of the policy changes using an instrumental
variables strategy. We x the price of beer at its sample average and compute the implied
ad valorem excise tax as the nominal tax divided by this time-invariant price. The only
variation in this simulated tax rate is due to policy changes. Using the simulated excise tax
rate to instrument for the actual excise tax rate, we replicate the specication in column
4 of Table 7. The point estimates of both tax elasticities are similar to those in previous
specications, but standard errors rise as expected since part of the variation in excise tax
rates has been excluded.
Thus far, our analysis has focused on changes in tax rates and alcohol consumption at
an annual frequency. One explanation of the di¤erence between the sales and excise tax
e¤ects at the annual frequency is learning: people might immediately perceive excise taxes,
but learn about changes in the sales tax over time. To test for such learning e¤ects, we
estimated specications including lags and leads of the tax variables and di¤erences over
longer horizons (e.g. two or three year changes, as in Gruber and Saez (2002)). This
analysis reveals no evidence of an increase in the sales tax elasticity over time. For example,
Column 4 of Table 8 shows the e¤ect of sales and excise tax changes on consumption over a
three-year horizon. The estimates show that an increase in the excise tax rate continues to
have a large negative e¤ect on alcohol consumption after three years, whereas an equivalent
increase in the sales tax does not.
As a supplementary analysis (not reported), we estimated the price elasticity of demand
using data on the average price of beer by year by state from the ACCRA survey. We
replicated specication 4 of Table 7, instrumenting the average price using the excise tax rate.
The estimated price elasticity of demand is 0.9, and the hypothesis that the price elasticity
of beer consumption equals the gross-of-sales-tax elasticity is rejected with p < 0:05.
20To clarify why ination generates identifying variation, consider the following example. Suppose the
pre-tax price of beer is $1 and that state A has a nominal alcohol tax of 50 cents, while state B has no excise
tax. If prices of all goods double, the gross-of-tax price of beer relative to other goods falls by 1:50 1:251:50 = 17%
in state A but is unchanged in state B.
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Relative Price Changes and Excise vs. Sales Taxes. As noted above, an important
concern with our analysis is that the sales tax applies to 40 percent of consumption goods,
and therefore leads to a smaller change in the relative price of alcohol than a change in the
excise tax. We evaluate the magnitude of the resulting bias in two ways. First, we estimate
the model using only the thirty states that fully exempted all food items from the sales tax
in 2000.21 In these states, changes in the sales tax always a¤ect the relative price of alcohol
and food (and non-alcoholic beverages), which is the most plausible substitute for alcohol.
Column 5 of Table 8 shows that the sales tax elasticity estimate remains quite small in
this subsample, suggesting that the substantial di¤erence between the sales and excise tax
elasticities is not purely due to the di¤erence in tax bases.
As an alternative approach, we calibrate the e¤ect of a 1 percent increase in a (hypo-
thetical) tax tA that applies solely to alcohol (x) and is excluded from the posted price.
Treating all goods other than alcohol as a composite commodity (y) of which 40 percent is
subject to sales tax, observe that a 1 percent increase in the gross-of-sales-tax price (1 + tS)
increases px
py
by 1:01
1:004
  1 ' 0:6 percent. It follows that the e¤ect of a 1 percent increase in
the tax tA that applies solely to alcohol is given by "1;1+tA =
1
0:6
"1;1+tS =
5
3
"1;1+tS . Scaling
up the largest estimated response to the sales tax in Table 7 of -0.20 by 5
3
yields an estimate
of "1;1+tA =  0:33, which remains substantially below the excise tax elasticity estimates.
Hence, this calibration also indicates that the wider sales tax base is unlikely to explain the
large di¤erence between the excise and sales tax elasticities.
A related concern is that increases in the beer excise tax may induce substitution to wine
and spirits, thereby biasing the beer tax elasticity up relative to the sales tax elasticity. To
assess the extent of substitution, we estimate the e¤ect of the beer excise tax on the share of
beer in total alcohol (ethanol) consumption. The estimates in column 6 of Table 8 show that
the beer share is insensitive to the beer tax rate. We also nd that the e¤ect of beer excise
taxes on total ethanol consumption is much larger than the e¤ect of sales taxes. These
ndings show that substitution between types of alcohol does not explain our results.
Summary. Averaging across the estimates in Tables 7 and 8, the mean estimate of the
21Unfortunately, we do not have historical data on which goods are subject to the sales tax. However,
case studies of some states suggest that the set of items subject to sales tax is fairly stable over time.
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gross-of-excise-tax elasticity is 0.84. The mean estimate of the gross-of-sales-tax elasticity
is 0.03. Scaling up the sales tax coe¢ cient by 5
3
, we obtain an implied elasticity of 0.05 for
a tax that is applied solely to alcohol at the register. Combining these estimates yields a
point estimate of  = "1;1+tS="1;1+tE = 0:06. We cannot reject the hypothesis that  = 0 
i.e., all individuals are inattentive to the tax added at the register given the standard error
on this point estimate.
6 Information vs. Tax Salience: Survey Evidence
The evidence above indicates that behavioral responses to commodity taxation depend sub-
stantially on whether taxes are included in posted prices. There are two potential expla-
nations for this nding. One is that customers are uninformed about the sales tax rate or
the set of goods subject to the sales tax. In this case, showing the tax-inclusive price tags
may have provided new information about tax rates, leading to a reduction in demand. An
alternative explanation is that most individuals do not compute the tax-inclusive price when
shopping, and focus instead on the salient pre-tax price. In this section, we distinguish
between these two mechanisms to understand how individual behavior should be modelled.
A few pieces of evidence in our preceding empirical analysis point toward the salience
mechanism. First, the fact that the experimental intervention had no detectable spillover
e¤ects on the taxable categories adjacent to the treatment group suggests that individuals
did not simply learn that toiletries are subject to sales tax. Second, one interpretation of
the return of demand to pre-experiment levels after the intervention ended is that there were
no persistent learning e¤ects: individuals began to focus again on the pre-tax price once the
tags are removed. In this case, however, we cannot rule out another plausible explanation:
the set of individuals who shop for these durable goods may vary substantially across weeks,
so customers in the weeks after the experiment may e¤ectively have been untreated. Finally,
in the alcohol analysis, we nd that individuals continue to respond less to the sales tax even
after they have had considerable time (e.g. 2 or 3 years) to acquire new information.
To test between the information and salience hypotheses more directly, we surveyed 91
customers entering the treatment store in August 2006 about their knowledge of sales taxes.
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Survey respondents were o¤ered candy bars and sodas to spend a few minutes lling out the
survey, which is displayed in Exhibit 2. After collecting basic demographic information, the
survey asked individuals to report whether each of eight goods (e.g. milk, toothpaste, beer)
were subject to sales tax or not. Many individuals remarked while lling out the survey
that they did not think about taxes while shopping, and therefore were hesitant to report
which goods were taxed. These individuals were asked to mark their best guess to avoid
nonresponse bias.22 To assess whether knowledge of taxes is correlated with experience,
we also asked whether individuals had purchased each of these goods recently. Finally, we
asked three questions about knowledge of tax rates the sales tax rate in the city where the
store is located, the state income tax rate, and the federal estate tax.
The results of the survey are summarized in Figure 3. Knowledge about sales taxes is
generally quite high. The median respondent answered 7 out of 8 of the questions about
taxable status of the goods correctly. The general pattern that people appear to know is
that food is not taxed, while inedible items and singoods are taxed. Exceptions to this
general heuristic led to the most errors. In California, carbonated beverages are subject
to sales tax, while cookies (junk food) are not. These two goods accounted for the largest
share of mistakes. Among individuals who got 7 out of the 8 questions right, Coca Cola
and cookies accounted for more than half the mistakes. Knowledge of the sales tax rate was
also high: 75 percent reported the sales tax rate within 0.5 percentage points of the true
rate, and 97 percent reported a rate between 6.75 percent and 8.75 percent. The modal
answer (15 percent of responses) was exactly 7.375 percent. Knowledge of taxes measured
as fraction of items whose tax status was identied correctly or deviation in reported sales
tax rate from the true rate was not correlated with any of the demographics.
Only 8 percent of individuals answered the estate tax question correctly, consistent with
the results of other surveys. On the income tax question, many respondents had trouble
distinguishing the California state income tax from the federal income tax, and reported
rates closer to federal tax rates. Knowledge of sales taxes may be greater than knowledge
22We solicited customers by asking them to ll out a survey for a study being conducted at UC-Berkeley.
We were careful not to mention that the survey concerned taxes, as this could induce selection bias toward
those knowledgeable about taxes. None of the individuals who initially agreed to ll out the survey declined
to do so after learning that it concerned taxes.
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of income or estate tax rates because consumers see the sales tax rate repeatedly (e.g., on
receipts), but only see income and estate tax rates occasionally (if at all).
In summary, most individuals are well informed about commodity tax rates when their
attention is drawn to the subject. Coupled with the evidence that behavioral responses to
taxation are larger when taxes are included in posted prices, this nding implies that many
individuals choose not to compute tax-inclusive prices when making consumption decisions.
7 A Model of Bounded Rationality and Taxation
We turn now to constructing a model that can explain the importance of salience in behav-
ioral responses to taxation while providing a tractable framework for welfare analysis. This
section sets up the model and characterizes individual behavior. In particular, we identify
conditions under which agents ignore taxes, and show that the theoretical predictions match
the evidence above as well as other stylized facts. We analyze the models social welfare
implications in the next section.
Setup. Consider an agent with wealth Z choosing consumption of two goods, x and y,
over which he has utility U(x; y) = u(x) + v(y). Good x is subject to a sales tax (not
included in the posted price) at rate t, while good y is untaxed. Choose units so that the
pre-tax prices of x and y are both 1.
We depart from the neoclassical model of consumer choice by assuming that the agent
pays a cost c to calculate the tax-inclusive price of good x, pt = 1+ t. This cost could reect
a cognitive cost of deliberation, as in Conlisk (1996), or simply an opportunity cost of time.23
The agent can alternatively make his consumption decision based on the pre-tax price, which
is posted on the shelf and hence costless to compute (i.e., perfectly salient). This binary
model of cognition either computing the tax-inclusive price exactly or not computing it at
all can be viewed as a special case of a model where agents can calculate the tax-inclusive
price more accurately by paying a greater computation cost.24 The qualitative results below
23This model assumes that the agent knows the tax rate t, as appears to be the case for most individuals
in practice. In an earlier version, we studied a model where individuals are uncertain about the gross-of-tax
price pt and have a prior over pt that can be rened by paying a cognitive cost. That model yielded results
very similar to those below.
24For example, adding 10% to the posted price is a less expensive approximation than adding 7.375%.
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hold in the more general model, but the empirical estimates needed to obtain quantitative
predictions di¤er.
An agent who computes the tax-inclusive price maximizes utility and chooses a consump-
tion bundle (x(t); y(t)) that satises
u0(x(t)) = (1 + t)v0(y(t)) (6)
(1 + t)x(t) + y(t) = Z
An important conceptual issue in modelling the behavior of agents who do not compute tax-
inclusive prices is that their consumption choices must still satisfy the true budget constraint
(1 + t)x + y = Z. Thus, one must specify a budget adjustment rulea way in which
an agent who uses the pre-tax price chooses x and y to maximize his utility while satisfying
his real budget constraint to close the model. With two goods, there are three intuitive
budget adjustment rules, which correspond to variations in the order in which consumption
of the goods is chosen. First, the agent can choose x to maximize utility while assuming
that he pays no taxes, and spend his remaining wealth on y. This budget adjustment rule
leads to a consumption bundle (xp1; y
p
1) that satises
u0(xp1) = v
0(Z   xp1)
yp1 = Z   (1 + t)xp1
Alternatively, the agent can choose y rst to maximize utility assuming t = 0, and spend his
remaining wealth on x. This leads to a bundle (xp2; y
p
2) that satises
u0(Z   yp2) = v0(yp2)
xp2 =
Z   yp2
1 + t
Figure 4 illustrates these two budget adjustment rules, showing how the initial (infeasible)
Such approximations are likely to be of greater importannce in other contexts, such as income taxation. For
instance, individuals choosing labor supply may use an approximation such as one-fourth of income goes
to taxesrather than simply using their pre-tax wage.
29
choice (x0; y0) is adjusted by cutting either x or y to arrive at a feasible allocation.25 The
gure also suggests a third option, which is to cut consumption of both x and y (shifting
the budget set inward) to accommodate the income lost to the tax. This leads to the third
budget adjustment rule, where the agent chooses x and y simultaneously. Here, the agent
ignores the tax on x when making his consumption decision, but recognizes that his net-of-tax
income is lower because of the tax. This leads to a bundle (xp3; y
p
3) that satises
u0(xp3) = v
0(yp3) (7)
xp3 + y
p
3 = Z   txp3
The intuition underlying this budget adjustment rule is easiest to see in a dynamic setting
where agents purchase x and y repeatedly. If such agents ignore the tax on x, they will
later recognize that they do not have as much money as they expected in their bank account,
and subsequently cut consumption of both x and y. As a result of this dynamic adjustment
process, the inattentive agent fails to incorporate the substitution e¤ect of the tax but fully
accounts for the income e¤ect, precisely as in (7).
Which of these budget adjustment rules best captures the consumption behavior of an
agent who ignores the tax on x is essentially an empirical question.26 The answer to this
question can vary across agents and markets. For example, credit-constrained agents may
be forced to cut back on consumption of y if they ignore the tax on x, while agents with
su¢ cient liquidity may be able to cut back on both y and future purchases of x. In the
interest of space, we focus below on the rst rule, where the agent chooses x rst and leaves
y as residual. Our qualitative results are not sensitive to the assumed budget adjustment
rule, with one exception: the e¢ ciency cost of taxation depends on the adjustment rule.
Agent Behavior with Quasilinear Utility. We rst characterize agent behavior when
utility is quasilinear in y: U(x; y) = u(x) + y. Assume u0(x) > 0; u00(x) < 0, limx!0 u0(x) =
25Thanks to Erzo Luttmer for suggesting this gure.
26One can also attempt to answer the question theoretically by making the choice of the decision rule
endogenous. The agent could calculate his utility under each rule, and follow the rule that yields highest
utility. In the quasilinear case, Jensens inequality implies that choosing the good with diminishing marginal
utility rst is optimal. See Reis (2006) for a related analysis of the choice between a consumption and savings
rule in a lifecycle model.
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1, and u0(Z) < 1 to guarantee an interior optimum at any t  0.
The agents problem can be solved in two stages: (1) choose an optimal bundle for any
given perceived price p; (2) decide whether to spend c on computing pt.27 Our main goal is
to characterize the latter decision. We do so by answering the question, How much does
the agents utility rise (measured using a money metric) if he computes the tax-inclusive
price pt? If this value is below c, the agent will not compute pt. The agents utility gain
from computing the tax-inclusive price is
G(t) = u(x) + Z   (1 + t)x   [u(xp) + Z   (1 + t)xp]
= u(x)  u(xp) + (1 + t)(xp   x).
where xp is the agents choice of x when he ignores the tax. Note that G(t) is a money metric
since utility is linear in y. Taking a second-order Taylor approximation of u(x) around x(t)
and using the rst order condition for x(t) gives:
G(t) ' u(x)  [u(x) + u0(x)(xp(t)  x) + 1
2
u00(x)(xp(t)  x)2] + (1 + t)(xp(t)  x)
=  1
2
u00(x)(x(t)  xp(t))2
Under the rst budget adjustment rule, xp(t) = x(0): demand for x coincides with what
would be demanded by a fully optimizing agent when t = 0.28 We can therefore use the
linear approximation x(t)  x(0) = t@x
@t
and the condition @x

@t
(t) = 1=u00(x(t)) to obtain:
G(t) '  1
2
@x
@t
t2 =
1
2
"x;p
1 + t
x(t)t2 =
1
2
"0x;px
(0)t2 (8)
27If the agent literally followed this strategy when deciding whether to compute pt, he would have to
calculate the tax-inclusive price in order to know the utility gain from making this calculation. Thus the
cost of solving the cognitive problem would be higher than the cost of fully optimizing consumption. This
is an example of the regression problemin bounded rationality models (Conlisk 1996). In this particular
case, the agent will presumably solve the problem of whether to compute tax-inclusive prices for a particular
class of goods (e.g. items in a grocery store) once, and then apply that rule whenever he considers buying
those products. In this repeated-decision setting, solving the cognitive problem once is likely to be less
expensive than computing the tax-inclusive price each time.
28With quasilinear utility, the rst and third adjustment rules result in the same allocation, because the
choice of x is independent of total income.
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where "x;p =  @x@t 1+tx(t) =  @x

@pt
1+t
x(t) denotes the price elasticity evaluated at pt = 1 + t and
"0x;p =  @x

@t
1
x(0) denotes the price elasticity at p = 1.
29 The key implication of equation
(8) for the analysis below is that G(t) is a second-order function of t.30 This property
follows directly from the envelope condition in utility maximization, which makes the rst-
order (u0) terms drop out in G(t). Figure 5a illustrates the result geometrically. The
value of computing pt is given by the lost consumer surplus from overconsumption of x,
shown by triangle A. Letting x = x(t)   x(0), the size of this triangle is given by
 1
2
tx =  1
2
t@x

@t
t = G(t). As t approaches 0, the size of this triangle diminishes at rate t2
because both its height and width diminish linearly with t.
It is optimal not to compute pt if G(t) < c, i.e. if t < T where T = [  2c@x=@t ]
1=2. The
threshold T is a bound for the range of taxes which the agent will rationally ignore. Now
consider how the threshold T varies relative to the cognitive cost as c approaches 0:
lim
c >0
T
c
= lim
c >0
[
2
@x=@t
1
c
]1=2 =1 (9)
This result shows that as cognitive costs become small, the range of taxes that are ignored
grows small at a slower (square root) rate. As a result, small cognitive costs can lead
to substantial inattention to taxes. To quantify what smalland substantialmean in
practice, we calibrate the value of computing pt at various sales tax rates using (8). Consider
a commodity on which the agent spends x0 = $10; 000 prior to the implementation of the
sales tax, and suppose the price elasticity of demand at that point is "0x;p = 1. The results
of the calibration exercise are presented in the rst column of Table 9. For example, a
10 percent tax is ignored if the cognitive cost is greater than $50. Intuitively, the agent
gains very little from adjustments in response to small changes in perceived prices because
he has already equated the marginal utilities of x and y.
29The point at which the price elasticity is evaluated matters because of the linear demand approximation.
The same issue arises in the standard Harberger formula, which is often written in terms of "0x;p, but
may provide more reliable estimates if written in terms of "x;p (Browning 1987). We provide the "x;p
representation because the formula for G(t) cannot be written in terms of x(0) and "0x;p when utility is not
quasilinear.
30This claim technically requires that @x

@t (t) is bounded below by some value K as t approaches 0 (i.e., as
pt approaches 1). Under this condition, f(t) behaves like a quadratic function locally around t = 0. We
assume that this regularity condition holds in deriving results below.
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General Utility. Next, we show that the result in (9) holds with arbitrary separable
utility. The utility gain from computing pt is:
eG(t) = fu(x(t)) + v(Z   (1 + t)x(t))  [u(xp(t)) + v(Z   (1 + t)xp(t))]g
This expression can be converted into a money-metric by dividing the utility gain by the
marginal utility of wealth, which equals v0(y(t)) at the optimum. In particular, an inat-
tentive agent must be paid approximately G(t) =
eG(t)
v0(y(t)) to bring his utility up to the
full-optimization level.31 Using a second-order Taylor approximation for the utility function
as above, we derive the following expression for G(t) in the appendix:
G(t) =
1
2
t2x(t)"x;p[
1
1 + t
+
x(t)
y(t)
y] (10)
where y =  v
00(y(t))
v0(y(t)) y
(t) measures the curvature of utility over y. When utility is quasi-
linear, y = 0, and G(t) reduces to (8). When y > 0, the tax has an income e¤ect that
makes jx(t) x(0)j larger than in the quasilinear case. As a result, G(t) is larger, because
it has two components: one that reects the substitution e¤ect (purchase less x because its
price is higher) and a second that reects the income e¤ect (purchase even less x because
net income is now lower). The second term emerges because the agent miscalculates his
net-of-tax income when choosing x under the rst budget adjustment rule. If the agent
follows the third adjustment rule, he does not make this error, and the cost of ignoring the
tax is the same as in the quasilinear case (with the compensated elasticity "cx;p replacing
"x;p). Regardless of the budget adjustment rule and utility function, G(t) is proportional
to t2 and hence the main analytical result limc >0 Tc =1 holds.
Aggregate Demand with Heterogeneous Agents. To link the model to the empirical evi-
dence, consider an economy populated by a continuum of agents who have identical prefer-
ences but heterogeneous cognitive costs, distributed according to a smooth cdf F (c). The
31More precisely, one can dene the gain from computing pt using the expenditure and indirect utility
functions dened in section 8: G(t) = [e(1; 0; V (1; t; Z)))   e(1; 0; V p(1; t; Z))]. We show in the appendix
that this expression equals (10) under a linear approximation for indirect utility.
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fraction of individuals who compute pt is
 = F (G()) = F (1
2
t2x(t)"x;p[
1
1 + t
+
x(t)
y(t)
y]) (11)
Intuitively, individuals with c below the threshold G(t) compute pt, while the rest focus on
the salient pre-tax price p. Hence, aggregate demand is given by
bx(1; t; (t)) = (t)x(t) + (1  (t))xp(t). (12)
Equation (12) shows that the bounded rationality model provides micro foundations for
the two-type framework in section 3. The aggregate demand function generated by the
model matches the evidence in sections 4-6. The calibrations indicate that many agents will
not compute tax-inclusive prices despite having the information to do so, consistent with the
low estimates of  and the survey evidence. The model also explains why individuals remain
inattentive to taxes in the long run. Since agents must pay a cost every time they calculate
a tax-inclusive price, tax salience matters in steady-state, and not just on the transition path
after a tax change.
Comparative Statics: Attention to Taxes. The fraction of agents who pay attention to
a tax is endogenously determined by factors such as the tax rate and elasticity of demand,
according to equation (11). The comparative statics of (11) yield the following predictions
about when agents are most likely to pay attention and respond to taxes.
(1) @
@x > 0. More individuals pay attention to taxes when making large, one time choices
(e.g. buying a house) than small, repeated purchases (e.g. food, clothing). This prediction
holds even if the small purchases aggregate to the same total expenditure over time as the
large purchase, as is the case for food and housing in practice (each accounts for about 20%
of the budget on average in the CEX). The reason is that the cognitive cost is a xed amount
paid at each transaction, whereas the benet of computing pt scales up with expenditure on
the good. In the context of labor income taxation, the model predicts that high income
households are more likely to respond to labor and capital income taxes because the stakes
are larger for them, consistent with evidence in Feldstein (1995), Goolsbee (2000), and Saez
(2004).
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(2) @
@t
> 0. Individuals are more likely to pay attention to taxes when tax rates are high,
because the cost of ignoring the tax grows with the square of the tax rate. By extension,
in a dynamic setting, individuals will pay greater attention to large tax reforms than small
changes in marginal rates. This could explain why cross-country comparisons (e.g. Prescott
2004, Davis and Henrekson 2006) nd larger e¤ects of taxes on behavior than studies that
focus on a short window around relatively small tax reforms (e.g. Gruber and Saez 2002).
(3) @
@"x;p
> 0. Individuals are more likely to compute tax-inclusive prices for products
where demand is elastic. If demand is inelastic, there is less benet from calculating pt,
since one would not change demand much even if the price were higher. This magnies
the e¤ect of elasticities on behavioral responses to taxation: higher elasticities lead to larger
responses both through a direct e¤ect of inducing larger responses and an indirect e¤ect of
raising the probability that individuals pay attention to taxes.
(4) @
@y
> 0. Individuals who have more curved utility e.g. because of credit constraints
or consumption commitments are more likely to compute pt (or at least net-of-tax income)
because they stand to lose more by ignoring taxes.
A nal set of predictions can be obtained in an extension of the model where individuals
face non-linear taxes. In the interest of space, we discuss these predictions without providing
formal derivations. One prediction is that individuals are more likely to pay attention to
policies that induce discontinuous changes in tax burdens e.g. due to eligibility cuto¤s or
tax holidays than to policies that induce continuous changes in tax burdens. The cost
of ignoring a discontinuous change in the tax burden is a linear (rst-order) function of the
amount of the tax. Consequently, behavioral responses to cli¤s in the tax schedule will
be large, whereas there will be limited bunchingat kink points. A related prediction is
that agents will respond more on the extensive margin than on the intensive margin to tax
policies. Both of these predictions are consistent with empirical evidence (see e.g., Saez
2002).
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8 E¢ ciency Cost and Incidence of Taxation
Auerbach (1985) and Kotliko¤ and Summers (1987) present elasticity-based formulas for
excess burden and incidence in the traditional model where agents fully perceive taxes. In
this section, we develop analogous formulas for the excess burden and incidence of a tax that
is not perfectly salient. Throughout, we restrict attention to tax policies implemented to
raise revenue (e.g., to nance a public good). Pigouvian taxes intended to correct individual
behavior are outside the scope of this paper.
8.1 E¢ ciency Cost
Denitions. Following Mohring (1971), we dene the excess burden of a tax using the
concept of equivalent variation. To incorporate salience e¤ects, we rst dene generalized
indirect utility and expenditure functions that permit prices and taxes to have di¤erent
e¤ects. Normalize the price of y to 1. Let V (p; t; Z) denote the agents indirect utility net
of any cognitive cost as a function of the posted price of x (p), the tax levied at the register
(t), and wealth (Z). Let e(p; t; V ) denote the agents expenditure function, which represents
the minimum wealth necessary to attain utility V given the posted price and tax, including
any cognitive cost. Let x(p; t; Z) denote uncompensated (Marshallian) demand for x and
xc(p; t; V ) denote the compensated (Hicksian) demand. Choosing units so that the pre-tax
price of x is 1 as above, let R(tE; tS; Z) = (tE + tS)x(1 + tE; tS; Z) denote the tax revenue
raised by imposing an tax tE that is included in the posted price p and a tax tS that is not.
For concreteness, one could think of tE as the excise tax and tS as the sales tax, in analogy
with the empirical analysis.
The excess burden of introducing a sales tax t that is not included in the posted price in
a previously untaxed market is:
EB(t) = Z   e(1; 0; V (1; t; Z)) R(0; t; Z)
= Z   e(1; 0; V (1; t; Z))  tx(1; t; Z)
The value EB(t) can be interpreted as the amount of additional tax revenue that could be
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collected from the consumer while keeping his utility constant if the distortionary tax were
replaced with a lump-sum tax. It is straightforward to extend this expression to a situation
with pre-existing taxes. Suppose that there are two pre-existing taxes on good x: an excise
tax tE0 and a sales tax t
S
0 . Let t0 = t
E
0 + t
S
0 denote the total tax. The excess burden of a
sales tax increase t given initial tax rates tS0 ; t
E
0 is
EB(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) = Z   e(1 + tE0 ; tS0 ; V1)  [R(tE0 ; tS0 +t; Z) R(tE0 ; tS0 ; e(1 + tE0 ; tS0 ; V1))]
where V1 = V (1 + tE0 ; t
S
0 +t; Z) denotes the agents indirect utility after the tax increase.
Following Auerbach (1985), this expression can be simplied to
EB(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) = Z   e(1 + tE0 ; tS0 ; V1) tx(1 + tE0 ; tS0 +t; Z) (13)
+(tE0 + t
S
0 )[xc(1 + t
E
0 ; t
S
0 ; V1)  x(1 + tE0 ; tS0 +t; Z)].
The last term in (13) reects the scal externality (lost tax revenue) that individuals
impose on the government if they reduce consumption of x.
Our objective is to derive expressions for (13) in terms of empirically estimable elasticities
when individuals behave according to the model in section 7. We begin with a graphical
derivation for a case without income e¤ects (quasilinear utility) in the next subsection. We
then turn to the general case, where the formulas for excess burden are more complicated
because income e¤ects can be distortionary when agents are inattentive.
8.1.1 Quasilinear Utility
When utility is quasilinear in y, the Marshallian and Hicksian demands coincide: x(p; t; Z) =
xc(p; t; V )  x(p; t) 8Z; V . Hence, the excess burden of a tax increase can be characterized
using the Marshallian demand curve and the notion of consumer surplus. We begin by
illustrating the excess burden of a tax increase for two agents, one who does not pay attention
to the sales tax and another who does, in Figure 5b. We then characterize aggregate
deadweight loss in the economy populated by agents with heterogeneous cognitive costs.
For simplicity, the gure assumes tE0 > 0 and t
S
0 = 0. However, the formulas below hold
37
with tS0 > 0. An algebraic derivation of the formulas is given in the appendix.
First, consider a consumer whose cognitive cost is su¢ ciently high that he does not
compute the tax-inclusive price even after the sales tax rate rises. We assume throughout
this subsection that this inattentive agent meets his budget by cutting only y, deferring
the calculation of excess burden under other budget adjustment rules to the general case
below. The agents consumption choice in the initial situation is depicted by xp0, the point
where u0(xp0) = 1 + t
E
0 . Since the agent does not reoptimize in response to the sales tax
increase t, the tax increase reduces consumer surplus by CSp = xp0t, shown in Figure
5b by the rectangle A+B+C. The increase in tax revenue is given by the same rectangle:
Rp = xp0t. Total surplus is unchanged, because the lost consumer surplus is fully
transferred to the government. Hence, the excess burden associated with the sales tax
increase for an inattentive agent is zero:
EBp(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) = CSp  Rp = 0.
Intuitively, since there is no change in consumption of x when the agent ignores the tax
change, the sales tax increase is equivalent to a lump-sum tax because utility is linear in y.
Note that EBp > 0 when agents ignore tax changes if utility over y is concave, as we show
below.
Now consider the e¤ects of the same tax increase for an agent with zero cognitive cost
(c = 0), who always computes pt. Letting x0 denote this agents consumption choice in the
initial situation and x1 the choice after the tax increase, the e¤ect of the tax increase on tax
revenue is
R(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) = (t0 +t)x1   t0x0 = tx0 + (t0 +t)
@x
@t
t
where the second term reects the loss in revenue from the agents behavioral response,
taking a linear approximation to the demand function as in Harberger (1964). The excess
burden of the tax increase for the reoptimizing agent is given by the familiar Harberger
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trapezoidwith area B+D in Figure 5b:
EB(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) =  
1
2
xt  t0x =  1
2
@x
@t
(t)2   t0@x

@t
(t)
 t0
1 + t0
"x;px

0t+
1
2
"x;px

0
(t)2
1 + t0
where "x;p =  @x@t 1+t0x0 is the price elasticity of demand at pt = 1 + t0.
Aggregate Deadweight Loss. We now characterize aggregate deadweight loss when the
fraction of agents who compute pt is endogenously determined as in section 7. Let 0 denote
the fraction of agents who compute pt when the sales tax rate is tS0 and 1 denote the same
after the tax increase. It is useful to divide the economy into three groups of agents. First,
agents with the highest cognitive costs (fraction 1  1) ignore both the initial tax and the
tax increase, and therefore do not change their consumption of x. There is no excess burden
from increasing the tax on these agents. Second, agents with the lowest cognitive costs
(fraction 0), optimize relative to the initial sales tax and reoptimize relative to the sales tax
increase. These agents contribute 0EB(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) to aggregate deadweight loss.
Third, agents with cognitive costs in the intermediate range (fraction 1   0) initially
ignored the sales tax, but now compute the full tax-inclusive price, leading to added dead-
weight loss of (1   0)EB(tS0 +tjtE0 ). In addition, these agents now expend the cost of
computing pt, which further contributes to deadweight loss because no cognitive costs are
incurred under lump sum taxation. To calculate the increase in deadweight loss, observe
that the total cognitive cost incurred in the population from the computation of sales tax at
rate tS is
C(tS) =
G(tS)Z
0
cf(c)dc (14)
The e¤ect of the tax increase on total cognitive costs can be calculated using a linear ap-
proximation to C(tS) as follows:
C(tS0 +t)  C(tS0 ) 
@C
@tS
(tS0 )t = G(t
S
0 )
@
@t
t = (1   0)G(tS0 ).
Hence the third group of agents contributes (1 0)fEB(tS0 +tjtE0 )+G(tS0 )g to aggregate
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deadweight loss. Summing the terms, we obtain
DWL(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) = 0EB(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) + (1   0)(EB(tS0 +tjtE0 ) +G(tS0 ))
= 1EB
(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) + (1   0)(EB(tS0 jtE0 ) +G(tS0 ))
= 1[x

0"x;pt0
t
1 + t0
+
1
2
x0"x;p
(t)2
1 + t0
] + 0";tSx

0"x;p
t0
1 + t0
t (15)
where ";tS =
@
@tS
tS0
0
. Equation (15) gives an empirically implementable formula for dead-
weight loss in the quasilinear case. It shows that an increase in tS generates deadweight loss
through two margins. First, the tax increase amplies distortionary costs for individuals
who compute tax-inclusive prices through the traditional Harberger channel. This e¤ect
is attenuated by 1 the fraction of individuals who compute the tax since there is no
excess burden for inattentive individuals in the quasilinear case. Second, the tax increase
raises the fraction of individuals who are attentive to tax-inclusive prices. For the marginal
switcherswho begin to compute pt after the tax change, the perceived tax increase is the
full amount of the sales tax, tS0 + t (since they previously ignored the sales tax entirely),
leading to a larger distortion in behavior. The marginal switchers earn no net private benet
from computing the tax-inclusive price, since the cognitive cost G fully o¤sets this gain. The
only consequence of their change in behavior is a rst-order revenue loss for the government,
since they now consume x < xp. The excess burden from the switchers is proportional to
";tS , which measures the sensitivity of attention to the tax rate.
Discussion. An important implication of (15) is that taxes which generate small utility
losses if ignored by individuals can nevertheless have large e¤ects on social welfare and
revenue. Mathematically, the source of this result is that an individuals utility loss from
ignoring a sales tax t (G(t)) is proportional to t2, whereas government revenue (R) and
deadweight loss (DWL) are proportional to t. Unlike individual utility, tax revenue has
not been optimized, and therefore rises linearly with the tax rate. Similarly, when there
is a pre-existing tax, excess burden rises linearly with t because attentive agents impose a
rst-order scal externality on the government when they reduce consumption of x.
To illustrate the di¤erence between individual and social welfare, we calibrate G, R,
and DWL for a range of tax increases in columns 2-6 of Table 9. As above, consider a
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good on which the agent initially spends x0 = $10; 000, and suppose the price elasticity of
demand is "0x;p = 1. Suppose the initial excise tax (included in the posted price) is t
E
0 = 25%
and the initial sales tax is tS0 = 0. The individuals losses from ignoring sales tax increases
are small, as shown in column 2. For example, the utility loss from ignoring a 10% sales
tax is $40 when there is a pre-existing excise tax of 25%.32 To analyze the e¤ects of a tax
increase on social welfare, it is useful to contrast the extreme cases where  is xed at 0 or 1.
When  = 0, the revenue from a 10% tax increase is 10%  10; 000 = $1; 000. In contrast,
when  = 1, the agents behavioral response of reducing demand for x reduces R to $720.
When  = 0, the sales tax has no e¤ect on social welfare in the quasilinear case. But when
 = 1, the sales tax generates an e¢ ciency cost of $240 six times the individuals private
utility loss from ignoring the tax because the sales tax amplies the distortion created
by the excise tax. These calibrations show that whether a tax increase is made salient or
not can be quite important from a social perspective even when individuals nd the issue
unimportant.33
The analysis above appears to imply that hidingtaxes to the extent possible given
the endogeneity of  always reduces deadweight loss. In the next section, we show that
this surprising result does not hold when utility is not quasilinear.34
8.1.2 General Case
In the general case, the excess burden of raising the tax rate by t for an agent with c = 0
(who always computes pt) is approximately
EB(tjtS0 ; tE0 )  t0
t
1 + t0
"cx;px

0 +
1
2
"cx;px

0
(t)2
1 + t0
32The individuals welfare gain from computing pt is slightly smaller with the pre-existing excise tax
because we have assumed that the elasticity equals 1 when the initial price is pt = 1:25 in column 2. Since
our approximations assume linear demand, this translates into a price elasticity below 1 at pt = 1.
33An analogous point applies to transfers. For example, individuals may not pay attention to the tax-
benet linkage in social security because of the small private gains from doing so. However, increasing the
salience of the tax-benet linkage could raise social welfare considerably by raising labor supply and income
tax revenue.
34Finkelstein (2007) shows that hidden taxes may also raise e¢ ciency costs due to political economy issues,
an important issue outside the scope of our analysis.
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where "cx;p denotes the compensated elasticity of demand (see e.g., Auerbach 1985).
To calculate excess burden for an inattentive agent, assume temporarily that there are
no pre-existing taxes. The excess burden of introducing a sales tax t is
EBp(t) = Z   e(1; 0; V p(1; t; Z))  txp(1; t; Z)
where V p(1; t; Z) is the utility attained by the agent when he does not optimize relative to
the true tax-inclusive price. Letting V (1; t; Z) denote the utility attained by an agent with
c = 0 (who does optimize relative to pt), some algebra yields
EBp(t) = EB(t) + [e(1; 0; V (1; t; Z)))  e(1; 0; V p(1; t; Z))]  t[xp   x(t)] (16)
where EB(t) is the excess burden of introducing the tax t for a fully-optimizing agent.
Equation (16) is an exact expression for the excess burden, which can be computed for
any given expenditure function and budget adjustment rule. The properties of EBp(t) are
sensitive to the budget adjustment rule. We therefore characterize EBpi under each of the
budget adjustment rules i = 1; 2; 3 separately, and then provide a formula for aggregate
deadweight loss where the fraction of agents using each budget adjustment rule can be
estimated empirically.
We begin with the rst rule, where the agent meets his budget by cutting consumption
of only y. Using a linear approximation to the demand function locally around x(t) as in
Browning (1987), we prove in the appendix that
EBp1(t) 
1
2
t2(1 + t)x(t)
x(t)
Z
x(t)
y(t)
"x;Zy (17)
where "x;Z = @x

@Z
Z
x(t) denotes the income elasticity of x and y =  v
00(y(t))
v0(y(t)) y
(t).
Equation (17) shows that when utility is not quasilinear (y > 0), a tax increase creates
an e¢ ciency loss even if demand for the taxed good does not change, contrary to traditional
intuition based on the full-optimization model. To understand this result, recall that the
excess burden of a distortionary tax is determined by the extent to which the agents con-
sumption allocation di¤ers from the allocation he would choose if subject to a lump sum tax
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of an equivalent amount. In the quasilinear case, the agents consumption bundle when ig-
noring the tax coincides with the bundle he would choose under lump sum taxation, because
the optimal choice of x does not depend on total income. When utility is not quasilinear,
the agent optimally reduces consumption of both x and y when faced with a lump sum tax.
Consequently, when the agent ignores the tax on x and and cuts consumption of only y to
meet his budget, he ends up overconsuming x relative to the optimum. The lost surplus from
this budget allocation error is a function of the income elasticity "x;Z , which determines the
extent of overconsumption of x, and the curvature of the utility function, which determines
the utility cost of the resulting underconsumption of y.
To see the intuition more concretely, consider an individual choosing consumption of
cars (x) and food (y). Suppose he chooses his car rst, overspending because he does not
perceive the tax, and therefore has to cut back on food, over which he has very curved utility
(high y). In this case, the ignored tax on cars leads to an ine¢ cient allocation of net-of-tax
income, which we term a distortionary income e¤ect. The resulting e¢ ciency loss could
be substantial, potentially greater than the (Harberger) e¢ ciency cost of a perfectly salient
tax.
The size of the distortionary income e¤ect depends critically on the budget adjustment
rule that the agent uses when ignoring the tax. If the agent chose consumption of food rst,
he could end up with an allocation closer to what he would have chosen under lump-sum
taxation. The excess burden of a tax t on good x if the inattentive agent follows the second
budget adjustment rule (choosing y rst and cutting consumption of x to meet the budget)
is
EBp2(t) 
1
2
t2
1 + t
x(t)
x(t)
Z
y(t)
x(t)
"y;Zx. (18)
If curvature of utility over cars (x) is low, EB
p
2(t) could be much smaller than EB
p
1(t).
Finally, if the agent follows the third rule cutting back on both x and y based on his
updated perception of net-of-tax income the distortionary income e¤ect disappears entirely.
Intuitively, such an agent chooses exactly the allocation he would have chosen under lump
sum taxation, because he accounts for the change in income but not the distortion in marginal
price. Thus EBp3(t) = 0. The general lesson is that the e¢ ciency cost of a tax that is
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ignored by agents is determined by the goods upon which the impact of the tax is borne. If
agents distribute the tax cost evenly across goods, excess burden is small. If the tax forces
agents to cut back on items where curvature of utility is high, excess burden is large.
Aggregate Deadweight Loss. Now suppose the economy has three types of agents, who
di¤er in the way they adjust their budgets if they ignore the tax on x. Let i denote the
fraction of the population that follow budget adjustment rule i. Let fi(c) denote the pdf of
cognitive costs for agents who follow rule i, and Gi(t) denote the gain to computing pt. The
fraction of agents who ignore the tax and follow rule i is given by i(t) = i
1R
Gi(t)
fi(c)dc. As
above, let the fraction of agents who ignore the tax in the aggregate economy be denoted by
1  (t) = i(t). With this notation, aggregate deadweight loss is
DWL(t)  1
2
t2x(t)[(t)
"cx;p
1 + t
+
x(t)
Z
f1(t)(1+t)x
(t)
y(t)
"x;zy+2(t)
1
1 + t
y(t)
x(t)
"y;zxg]+Cg(t)
(19)
where Cg(t) = ii
Gi(t)R
0
cfi(c)dc is the total cognitive cost expended by the three types of
agents.
A tractable formula for the deadweight cost of raising the sales tax given a pre-existing
sales tax tS0 can be obtained by di¤erentiating (19), subject to two conditions. First,
assume that the optimal demand functions x(t) and y(t) are locally linear in income and
price at tS0 . Second, assume that the tax increase a¤ects the is equi-proportionally, i.e.
"i;t = "j ;t = "1 ;t. We show in the appendix that under these two conditions, the marginal
deadweight loss of raising the tax rate by t starting from an initial sales tax of tS0 (and
excise tax tE0 = 0) is
DWL(tjtS0 ) = tx0tS0 [(tS0 )
"cx;p
1 + tS0
+
x0
Z
f1(tS0 )
x0
y0
(1 + tS0 )"x;zy + 2(t
S
0 )
1 + 1
2
tS0
(1 + tS0 )
2
y0
x0
"y;zxg]
 t"x;p(tS0 )2x0
x0
Z
[1(t
S
0 )
x0
y0
"x;zy + 2(t
S
0 )
y0
x0
"y;z
(1 + tS0 )
2
x]
+t";tS(t
S
0 )[x
p   x0] (20)
where xp =  i
1 x
p
i denotes the average consumption of x among agents who ignore the pre-
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existing tax.35 This equation shows that an increase in the sales tax generates deadweight
loss through two channels. First, it amplies distortions for both attentive agents and
inattentive agents. The tax increase magnies the wedge between individualschoices and
socially optimal consumption bundles in proportion to tS0 , as shown in the rst line of (20).
For inattentive agents, part of the e¢ ciency loss is o¤set by the fact that an optimizing
agent would spend little on a highly taxed good (x(t) becomes small), reducing the scale
of the budget allocation error. This o¤set e¤ect, which corresponds to the second line
of (20), is proportional to (tS0 )
2 and hence is relatively small unless the initial tax rate is
high. The second channel through which a tax increase raises deadweight loss is by making
more individuals compute the tax-inclusive price. This e¤ect, which corresponds to the
third line of (20), strictly raises deadweight loss despite reducing excess burden from the
distortionary income e¤ect because the added cognitive costs o¤set the benet of computing
pt for the switchers. The net result is that switchers impose a rst-order revenue loss on
the government by reducing consumption of x by [xp   x(tS0 )] on average.
Although (20) has many terms, it is at least in principle empirically implementable.
The elasticities can be estimated by examining behavioral responses to tax changes and
other policies, as in conventional empirical studies. To see how the i parameters can be
estimated empirically, rst note that the fraction  can be estimated by either of the two
methods proposed in section 3. The fractions f i
1 g can then be estimated by comparing
how a $1 change in income (Z) a¤ects the consumption allocation of individuals who ignore
the sales tax relative to a $1 change in net-of-tax income due to the sales tax. The parameter
3
1  is given by the fraction of agents whose consumption bundles coincide under the two
scenarios. The remaining fractions can be calculated by examining which goods individuals
cut (x or y in the two-good case) to meet their budget.
As a simple illustration, we calculate the marginal e¢ ciency cost of increasing the sales
tax, which applies to x
Z
= 0:4 of consumption on average in the U.S. Suppose all agents
ignore sales taxes when making consumption decisions, and absorb its impact entirely on
untaxed goods (1 = 1). If the income and price elasticity of food consumption are 1
35When 1 = 1, y = 0, and t
E
0 = 0, equation (20) reduces to a rst-order approximation (omitting the
t2 terms) of equation (15) derived in the quasi-linear case.
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("x;p = "x;Z = 1) and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion over the remaining consumption
bundle is y = 1, then DWL(tjtS0 ) = xt xZ xy tS0 . Note that the revenue collected by raising
the sales tax by t is approximately Rp(t) = xt. Hence, under these parameters, raising
the sales tax starting from the current rate of approximately 10 percent would generate an
e¢ ciency loss of approximately 0:4 2
3
 0:10 = 2:7% percent of revenue raised.
Discussion. Although we motivated the e¢ ciency analysis by a bounded rationality
model, the expressions for excess burden for agents who do not compute pt (EB
p
i (t)) do
not rely on this particular model of individual behavior. This point reects Bernheim and
Rangels (2007) insight that making welfare statements in a model where agents choices
depend on ancillary conditions,such as the salience of taxes, does not require a positive
theory of behavior. One only needs a means of judging which ancillary condition reveals
the agents true ranking of choices. If one directly assumes that the agents choices in the
state where taxes are perfectly salient reveal his true preferences, one obtains the expressions
for EBpi (t) above without further assumptions about why salience matters. Hence, in the
derivations of EBpi (t), the bounded rationality theory can be viewed as a justication for why
the choices made when taxes are salient reveal true preferences. The bounded rationality
model is, however, needed to obtain the expressions for aggregate deadweight loss in (19)
and (20), since calculating the fraction of agents who pay attention to the tax requires a
positive theory of tax perceptions.
Our stylized model places an upper bound on the excess burden that can be caused by
taxes that agents ignore. Since EBp arises entirely from a private utility cost, an agent
with cognitive cost c must have EBp < c, else he would compute the tax-inclusive price.
This seems to imply that the e¢ ciency cost of a hiddentax will always be negligible in
magnitude. While this logic is correct in our stylized model, we believe that deadweight
loss from distortionary income e¤ects could potentially be large in practice, for two reasons.
First, many individuals are likely to be uncertain about the benets of optimizing relative to
various tax policies. When faced with uncertainty, boundedly rational agents may not pay
attention to aspects of the tax code that have large nancial consequences (e.g. tax credits,
Roth vs. Traditional IRAs) because the cost of optimizing relative to all policies outweighs
the expected benet from doing so. As a result, a tax that is not salient could produce large
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budget allocation errors and lead to a substantial e¢ ciency loss. Second, individuals often
make repeated small purchases that aggregate to a large fraction of total expenditure over
time. A boundedly rational agent may ignore the tax because the value of computing pt for
each transaction is small; however, the total welfare loss over time from the resulting budget
allocation errors could be large. These points suggest that incorporating uncertainty and
dynamics into the analysis would be a useful direction for future work.
8.2 Incidence
How is the burden of a tax shared between consumers and producers in competitive equilib-
rium when some individuals are inattentive to taxes? To answer this question, we analyze
the incidence of a tax t (which is not included in the posted price) in a partial equilibrium
model. Let D(pt) = D(p + t) denote demand for individuals who compute pt and D(p)
denote demand by inattentive individuals.36 The supply curve S(p) is a function solely of
the pre-tax price. The market-clearing pre-tax price p equates supply and demand:
(t)D(p+ t) + (1  (t))D(p) = S(p) (21)
Our objective is to calculate dp
dt
and dpt
dt
, the incidence of a tax on producers and consumers,
respectively. Implicitly di¤erentiating (21), we obtain:
@D
@p
[
dp
dt
+ ] +
@
@t
[D(p+ t) D(p)] = @S
@p
dp
dt
Using a linear approximation to the demand function and collecting terms yields
dp
dt
=  "D;p(1 + ";t)
"S;p + "D;p
(22)
dpt
dt
= 1 +
dp
dt
=
"S;p + "D;p[1  (1 + ";t)]
"S;p + "D;p
36The analysis below neglects any change in demand by inattentive agents that arises from an income e¤ect
of the tax on demand for x, as would occur under the second or third budget adjustment rules. Reduction
in demand due to such income e¤ects would shift a greater burden of the tax to producers.
47
where "D;p =  @D@p pD(p) is the price elasticity of demand at the pre-tax price, "S;p = @S@p pS is
the price elasticity of supply, and ";t = @@t
t

is the elasticity of  with respect to the tax rate.
When  = 1, (22) reduces to the traditional formula for incidence.
Fixed . To characterize the e¤ects of inattention on tax incidence, we begin with the
case where the fraction of inattentive individuals is exogenously xed at some positive level
( < 1). When ";t = 0, the incidence of the tax on supply reduces to
dp
dt
=   "D;p
"S;p + "D;p
=   "D;1+t
"S;p + "D;p
(23)
where "D;1+t = "D;p is the elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to the gross-of-tax
price. Equation (23) shows that incidence on producers is attenuated by the factor  relative
to the traditional model without salience e¤ects. Since demand is less sensitive to the tax,
producers are under less pressure to reduce the pre-tax price, and consumers bear more of
the burden in equilibrium when  is low (@[dpt
dt
]=@ < 0). In the extreme case where  = 0,
consumers bear all of the tax, because their demand is unchanged by the tax.
One interpretation of this result is that demand e¤ectively becomes more inelastic when
individuals are inattentive, leading to greater incidence on consumers. Though reductions
in  and "D;p both increase incidence on demand, the magnitudes of the two e¤ects are not
equivalent. This is apparent in (23), since  attenuates only the "D;p term in the numerator
in the expression for dp
dt
. A 1 percent reduction in  raises incidence on demand by more
than a 1 percent reduction in "D;p, even though both changes a¤ect the gross-of-tax elasticity
"D;1+t equivalently. Intuitively, when rms reduce their pre-tax prices to share the burden of
the tax, demand from the inattentive consumers who focus on the pre-tax price rises relative
to the no-tax case, since they focus solely on the pre-tax price. Because of this o¤setting
increase in demand, rms need to reduce p by a smaller amount in order to re-equilibriate
the market when inattention is prevalent.
Distinguishing the two components of "D;1+t can be quantitatively important, particularly
when the supply elasticity "S;p is small. As "S;p approaches 0,
dp
dt
approaches , irrespective of
"D;p. Suppliers can shift considerable incidence to consumers even when supply is inelastic
if they are in a market where consumers are inattentive. As a quantitative illustration,
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contrast two markets, A and B, where "AS;p = "
B
S;p = 0:1. In market A, "
A
D;p = 0:3 and
A = 1; in market B, "BD;p = 1 and 
B = 0:3. In both markets, "D;1+t = 0:3. However,
[dp
dt
]A =  0:75 whereas [dp
dt
]B =  0:27. In market A, suppliers are forced to bear most of
the incidence since demand is 3 times more elastic to price than supply. In market B, even
though demand is 10 times as price elastic as supply, producers are able to shift most of the
incidence of the tax because only 30 percent of the individuals compute pt.
This example illustrates that the shortcutof estimating the tax-elasticity of demand
"D;1+t = "D;p and applying the standard formula to calculate incidence fails. To calculate
incidence when some agents are inattentive, one must estimate both the fundamentalprice
elasticity "D;p and  or, equivalently, both "D;1+t and "D;p, as in our empirical analysis 
and apply (23).
Endogenous . Now consider the case where  is endogenously determined according to
(11). Letting m = [1 + (x
y
)y] denote the amplication factor for G(t) when utility is not
quasi-linear, note that  = F (1
2
"D;pD(p)mt
2) where D(p) is demand at the pre-tax price and
"D;p is the price elasticity of demand at that point. Plugging in this denition of  and
";t =
f(c)
F (c)
"D;pD(p)mt
2 into (22), it follows that
dp
dt
=  "D;p(F (
1
2
"D;pD(p)mt
2) + f(c)"D;pD(p)mt
2)
"S;p + "D;p
(24)
This equation shows that the endogeneity of  has several additional implications for tax
incidence. First, dp
dt
is more negative when  varies with t than when  is xed exogenously.
Producers are forced to reduce prices further when  is endogenous, because more individuals
notice taxes when tax rates are high. The endogeneity of attention therefore mitigates the
extent to which large taxes are borne by consumers. Second, (24) shows that the elasticity
of demand "D;p has an amplied e¤ect on incidence when  is endogenous. Consumers
are less likely to pay attention to taxes in markets where demand is inelastic. A lower
"D;p therefore leads to more incidence on consumers both through the traditional Harberger
channel and through increased inattention. Third, consumers are more likely to bear taxes
on inexpensive goods (D small) and goods subject to low taxes (t small), since they are less
likely to compute tax-inclusive prices when buying such products.
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Discussion. The classic tax neutrality result  that the incidence of taxes does not
depend on whether the tax is levied on the consumer or producer in a competitive market
does not hold when agents are inattentive.37 If a producer wishes to pass a tax levied
on the business (such as the excise tax on alcohol or a tari¤ on an intermediate input) to
consumers, he generally must include it in the posted price of the good, limiting his ability
to shift the tax to the consumer.38 In contrast, many consumers may not pay attention to
taxes levied on the demand side (such as the sales tax or vehicle excise fees) and thus could
bear most of the burden of those taxes.
The model can also cast light on the distributional incidence of taxes if we allow for
heterogeneity beyond cognitive costs. For example, consumers bear more of the incidence of
taxes on inelastically demanded items that are purchased in small quantities, such as food or
clothing. Insofar as such goods constitute a larger fraction of expenditure for lower income
individuals, commodity taxes that are not salient (i.e., sales taxes as implemented in the
U.S.) may have undesirable distributional e¤ects. Another example arises from the fact
that individuals with lower cognitive costs are more likely to substitute toward behaviors
that reduce their tax burdens when tax policies are not salient. If higher income individuals
have lower cognitive costs e.g., if education lowers costs of cognition opaque or complex
tax and transfer policies could have undesirable e¤ects on equity.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed empirically that behavioral responses to commodity taxes di¤er
signicantly depending on whether taxes are included in posted prices. Individuals are
well informed about commodity taxes when their attention is drawn to the topic, suggesting
that salience is an important determinant of behavioral responses to taxation. We showed
37Interestingly, Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettlemeyer (2006) report evidence consistent with this prediction.
They nd that 35% of manufacturer rebates given to car dealers are passed through to the buyer, while 85%
of rebates given to buyers stay with the buyer. Their interpretation of this nding is that most consumers
did not nd out about the dealer rebates, but did know (by design) about the consumer rebates.
38Producers may also have access to technologies such as add-ons or after-market fees that allow them
to charge customers in a less salient manner. In such an environment, producers may be able to shift a tax
onto consumers by changing the prices of these shrouded attributes(Gabaix and Laibson 2006).
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that introducing small cognitive costs of computing tax-inclusive prices into the neoclassical
model of consumer choice can explain our empirical ndings as well as other stylized facts.
These small cognitive costs can have substantial impact on the welfare consequences of
tax policies. To characterize these welfare consequences, we developed Harberger-type
formulas for the incidence and e¢ ciency cost of taxation that can be easily adapted to other
applications, such as income and capital taxation. Much as Harbergers analysis identied
the compensated elasticity as a key parameter to be estimated in subsequent work, the
present analysis indicates that estimating tax perceptions (, ";t) and the magnitude of
distortionary income e¤ects due to inattention ("x;Z , y) would improve our understanding
of the e¢ ciency costs and incidence of taxation.
The nding that individuals optimize imperfectly even with respect to relatively simple,
linear commodity taxes suggests that similar issues may arise in the analysis of a broad set
of policies. In future work, it would be interesting to revisit studies that have estimated
behavioral responses to taxation and calculate the utility cost of failing to optimize against
the tax changes used for identication. Such an analysis could shed light on which tax
reforms are most likely to identify the fundamental price elasticities relevant for the analysis
of incidence and e¢ ciency. More generally, the willingness-to-pay approach proposed here
can be applied to understand the heuristics agents use to simplify the tax code. For example,
in ongoing work, we nd that individuals are likely to value information about their average
income tax rates more than information about marginal rates under plausible conditions.
This could potentially explain why individuals are more aware of and responsive to average
rates than marginal rates (Liebman and Zeckhauser 2004).
Our theoretical analysis should be viewed as a rst step toward analyzing the welfare
consequences of government policies when agents do not adhere to the neoclassical paradigm.
The approach we have proposed is to model the heuristics that agents use to ltera tax
policy before attempting to determine the e¤ects of the policy on behavior and welfare.
Building on this approach could ultimately shed light on a wide range of normative issues
that have received attention in recent policy debates, such as consumption taxation (where
taxes may be included in posted prices) and the value of tax simplication.
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Appendix A: Data Construction
Grocery Scanner Data. The store changes product prices on Wednesday nights and
leaves the prices xed (with rare exceptions) for the following week, termed a promotional
week. To synchronize our intervention with this pricing cycle, a team of researchers and
research assistants printed tags every Wednesday night and attached them to each of the
750 products. The tags were changed between 11 pm and 2 am, which are low-tra¢ c times
at the store. The tags were printed using a template and card stock supplied by the store
(often used for sales or other additional information on a product) in order to match the
color scheme and layout familiar to customers.
The raw scanner data provided by the grocery chain contains information on weekly
revenue and quantity sold for each product (UPC id) that was sold among the 108 cate-
gories listed in Appendix Table 1 in the three stores from 2005 week 1 to 2006 week 15.
We construct price as revenue divided by quantity. The original dataset contains 331,508
product-week-store observations. The quantity and revenue variables are measured net of
returns (i.e., returns count as negative sales). We exclude 1,756 observations where the
weekly quantity or revenue was zero or negative, which are cases where as many or more
items were returned than purchased in that week. Including these observations does not
a¤ect the results. Finally, we aggregate to the category-week-store level by summing quan-
tity and revenue across products, setting the sum to zero if no products were sold in a given
category-week-store.
The average price for each category of goods is dened as Pct = i2c(pitqi)=i2cqi where
c indexes the category, t time, and i products, pit is the price of good i at time t, and qi is
the average quantity sold of good i. This category price is e¤ectively a price index for
a xed basket of products where each products weight in the basket is determined by its
average weekly sales over the period before and during the experiment. Since the scanner
data reports only items that have sold each week, we impute prices for unsold items when
constructing Pct. In particular, we use the price in the last observed transaction for unsold
products; if no previous price is available, we use the next available price. Alternative
imputation methods such as using the closest observed price, or an average of previous
and subsequent prices give similar results. Varying the imputation technique has little
impact on the estimates in Tables 4 and 5 because items requiring imputation have low sales
volume, and therefore receive little weight in the category-level price variable.
Alcohol Consumption and Tax Data. Data on aggregate annual beer, wine, spirits, and
ethanol consumption by state are available from the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism (2006) from 1970-2003. These data contain information on total gallons of beer
sold by wholesalers because this measure determines tax liabilities. See Nephew et al. (2004)
and Lakins et al. (2004) for details on data construction.
State excise tax rates on beer are primarily obtained from the Brewers Almanac (var-
ious years), published annually by the Beer Institute. These rates have been veried and
corrected using the Tax Foundations State Tax Collections and Rates (various years) and
the State Tax Handbook. Our measure of the excise rate includes taxes that are statuto-
rily localexcise taxes which are sometime excluded from state statistics available in the
Brewers Almanac  that are applied state-wide. Specically, in Alabama, Georgia, and
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Louisiana all counties or localities levy an excise tax in addition to the state excise tax.
Excise taxes on alcohol frequently di¤er by product, packaging, and whether sold for on-
or o¤-premise consumption. In states where rates di¤er, our measure corresponds to the
excise tax on packaged 12oz. beer, sold for o¤-premise consumption, with an alcohol content
of 3.2 percent or more. Excise rates on other beer products are highly correlated with this
measure across states, and the timing of tax changes for di¤erent categories of alcoholic
beverages within a state are virtually identical. Per-gallon taxes are converted to per-case
rates by multiplying by 2.25, the number of gallons in 24 12oz. cans or bottles. The excise
tax rate is converted into an ad valorem rate by dividing the real CPI-adjusted beer excise
tax per case in year 2000 dollars by the average cost of a case of beer in the United States
in 2000, as measured by the Beer Institute. Since Alaska has a higher price level than the
continental United States, we follow Census Bureau practice and adjust its price level up by
25 percent when calculating the percentage excise tax rate. None of our results are a¤ected
by this adjustment, or by excluding Alaska entirely.
State sales taxes are obtained primarily from the World Tax Database (2006) at the
University of Michigan. These data were veried and corrected using state Department of
Revenue websites and the State Tax Handbook. Four states (KS, VT, DC, MN) apply a
higher sales tax rate to alcohol than other products. In those states we include the alcohol
rate rather than the general sales rate when they di¤er. We supplement the data on state-
level sales taxes with data on average local sales tax rates, which are imputed from data on
local revenues from the Census Bureaus Survey of State and Local Government Finances
and a tax base dened as state revenues divided by the state rate.
Since our estimation strategy relies on the timing and magnitude of the tax changes, we
evaluate the precision of the data by regressing the change in the log of state tax revenues
on the change in the log of the sales tax rate, controlling for state income. In the pooled
sample, the coe¢ cient estimate on the sales tax rate is 0.76 (s.e. 0.03). A state-by-state
analysis of changes in rates and changes in revenues also yields similarly high correlations,
with the exception of West Virginia. In WV, the correlation between sales tax rates and
revenues is near zero and statistically insignicant, perhaps because the tax base is often
changed at the same time as the rate. Since this problem could articially attenuate the
sales tax elasticity, we exclude West Virginia from our analysis.
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Appendix B: Proofs
Derivation of Equation (10) for G(t) in General Case
Let (xp; yp) denote the agents allocation when he ignores the tax. Start from the
denition of the gain in utility from computing the tax-inclusive price:
eG(t) = u(x)  u(xp) + v(y)  v(yp)
 u0(x)(x   xp)  1
2
u00(x)(x   xp)2 + v0(y)(y   yp)  1
2
v00(y)(y   yp)2
Using the rst-order-condition that characterizes the choice of the fully-optimizing agent,
u0(x) = (1 + t)v0(y), we obtain
eG(t) =  1
2
u00(x)(x   xp)2 + 1
2
v00(y)(y   yp)2
=  1
2
(x   xp)2[u00(x) + v00(y)(1 + t)2] (25)
Next, totally di¤erentiating the fully-optimizing agents rst-order-condition with respect
to t yields
u00(x)
@x
@t
= v0(y) + (1 + t)v00(y)
@y
@t
= v0(y) + (1 + t)[ (1 + t)@x

@t
  x]v00(y).
It follows that
[u00(x) + (1 + t)2v00(y)]
@x
@t
= v0(y)  (1 + t)xv00(y)
and hence eG(t) =  1
2
(x   xp)2 [v
0(y)  (1 + t)xv00(y)]
@x=@t
. (26)
The derivation of (26) does not depend on the budget adjustment rule used by the
inattentive agent. To simplify (26) further, we express x   xp in terms of elasticities by
specifying how the agent sets xp. Under the rst budget adjustment rule, where the agent
chooses x rst, we can linearly approximate x   xp = @x
@t
(t)t, reecting the fact that the
di¤erence between x and xp is proportional to the e¤ect of the tax on x for the optimizing
agent. It follows that
eG(t) = 1
2
t2
1 + t
"x;px
(t)v0(y)  1
2
t2"x;px
(t)2v00(y)
where "x;p =  @x@t 1+tx0 denotes the price elasticity of x at pt = 1 + t. Dening y =
 v00(y(t))
v0(y(t)) y
(t) yields
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G(t) =
eG(t)
v0(y)
=
1
2
t2"x;px
(t)[
1
1 + t
+
x(t)
y(t)
y].
Under the second budget adjustment rule, an analogous expression for G(t) can be derived
as follows. Di¤erentiating the agents f.o.c. and rearranging terms, it can be shown that
[u00(x) + v00(y)(1 + t)2] =  @y
@t
[u0(x)  xu00(x)]. Next, observe that x   xp = yp y
1+t
and
y yp = @y
@t
. Plugging these expressions into (25) and normalizing by v0(y) = u0(x)=(1+t),
we obtain
G2(t) =
1
2
t2"y;py
(t)
1
(1 + t)2
[1  x] (27)
where x =  u
00(x)x
u0(x) .
Derivation of Equation (15) for DWL(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) in Quasilinear Case
To derive an exact measure for the excess burden in the quasilinear case algebraically,
consider an agent with cognitive cost c. Let  = 0 if the agent does not compute pt and
 = 1 if he does. Then the agents indirect utility is
V (p; t; Z) = Z   (p+ t)x(p; t) + u(x(p; t))  c(t)
and hence the expenditure function is
e(p; t; V ) = V + (p+ t)x(p; t)  u(x(p; t)) + c(t)
Assume temporarily that (t) = (t + t), i.e. the agent does not change his cognitive
decision following the tax change. Then substituting the preceding expressions for V and e
into (13) with p = 1 + tE0 yields
EB(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) = [u(x(1+ tE0 ; tS0 )) x(1+ tE0 ; tS0 )]  [u(x(1+ tE0 ; tS0 +t)) x(1+ tE0 ; tS0 +t)]
(28)
For agents who ignore taxes that are not included in posted prices, x(1 + tE0 ; t
S
0 ) = x(1 +
t0; t
S
0 +t) and hence EB
p(t) = 0:
For agents who always re-optimize relative to tax-inclusive prices, (28) gives an exact
measure of excess burden, which could in principle be calculated by recovering the underlying
utility u from choice data, as in Hausman (1981). Using a quadratic approximation to u
and letting x0 = x
(1 + t0), we obtain
EB(tjtS0 ; tE0 )  t0"x;px0
t
1 + t0
+
1
2
"x;px

0
(t)2
1 + t0
To characterize aggregate deadweight loss in the economy with heterogeneous agents, observe
that deadweight loss at tax rates tS; tE is given by EB(tE) + (tS)EB(tSjtE) + C(tS).
Letting 1 = (tS0 +t) and 0 = (t
S
0 ), we obtain
DWL(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) = (tS0 +t)EB(tS0 +tjtE0 )  (tS0 )EB(tS0 jtE0 ) + C(tS0 +t)  C(tS0 )
= 1EB
(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) + (1   0)EB(tS0 jtE0 ) + (1   0)G(tS0 ))
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Using the denition of EB yields
DWL(tjtS0 ; tE0 ) = 1[x0"x;pt0
t
1 + t0
+
1
2
x0"x;p
(t)2
1 + t0
]
+
@
@t
t( 1
2
@x
@t
(tS0 )
2   tE0
@x
@t
ts0  
1
2
@x
@t
(tS0 )
2)
and some algebra yields (15).
Derivation of Equation (17) for Excess Burden EBp1 in General Case
Starting from equation (16), dene xc = xc(1; 0; V (1; t; Z)) as the Hicksian demand at
the original level of utility when the tax is removed. Using the quadratic approximation
EB(t) = 1
2
t2
1+t
x(t)"cx;p yields
EBp(t) =
1
2
t2
1 + t
x(t)"cx;p + [e(1; 0; V
(1; t; Z)))  e(1; 0; V p(1; t; Z))]  t[xp   x(t)] (29)
We rst establish that [e(1; 0; V (1; t; Z)  e(1; 0; V P (1; t; Z)] = G(t) under a linear approx-
imation of the Hicksian demand functions. Observe that
[e(1; 0; V (1; t; Z)  e(1; 0; V P (1; t; Z)]
= [xc(1; 0; V )  xc(1; 0; V p)] + [yc(1; 0; V )  yc(1; 0; V p)]
 [@x
c
@V
+
@yc
@V
][V (1; t; Z)  V P (1; t; Z)]
Totally di¤erentiating the utility constraint for the expenditure minimization problem with
respect to V and using the agents rst-order condition when t = 0 yields
@xc
@V
+
@yc
@V
=
1
v0(y)
Hence
[e(1; 0; V (1; t; Z)  e(1; 0; V P (1; t; Z)] = 1
v0(y)
[V (1; t; Z)  V P (1; t; Z)] = G(t).
Returning to (29), it follows that
EBp(t) =
1
2
t2
1 + t
x(t)"cx;p +G(t)  t[xp   x(t)] (30)
This equation for EBp holds irrespective of the budget adjustment rule. To go further, we
plug in the expression for G(t) when the agent uses the rst budget adjustment rule in (10)
to obtain
EBp1(t) =
1
2
t2x(t)
"cx;p
1 + t
+
1
2
t2x(t)"x;p(
1
1 + t
+
x(t)
y(t)
y)  t[xp   x(t)]
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Next, using the approximation [xp   x(t)] = [x(t = 0)  x(t)] =  @x
@t
t yields
EBp1(t) =
1
2
t2x(t)
"cx;p
1 + t
+
1
2
t2x(t)"x;p(
1
1 + t
+
x(t)
y(t)
y)  t2x(t)
"x;p
1 + t
(31)
=
1
2
t2
1 + t
x(t)["cx;p   "x;p] +
1
2
t2x(t)"x;p
x(t)
y(t)
y (32)
The key step in simplifying this expression is to recognize that the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion is related to the ratio of the income e¤ect to the substitution e¤ect (Chetty 2006):
y =
y(t)
Z
"x;z
"cx;p
(33)
To derive (33), implicitly di¤erentiate the fully-optimizing rst-order-condition u0(x(t)) =
ptv
0(y(t)) to calculate @x

@pt
and @x

@Z
:
@x
@pt
=
v0(y)  xptv00(y)
u00(x) + p2tv00(y)
@x
@Z
=
ptv
00(y)
u00(x) + p2tv00(y)
Using the Slutsky equation @x
c
@pt
= @x

@pt
+ x@x

@Z
, we obtain
@x=@Z
@xc=@pt
=
(1 + t)v00(y)
v0(y)
Finally, dening "cx;p =  @x
c
@pt
1+t
x0
as the compensated elasticity at pt = 1+ t and "x;Z = @x@Z
Z
x0
,
and rearranging yields (33). Plugging in the expression for y into (31), using the Slutsky
equation "cx;p   "x;p =  "x;Z (1+t)xZ and collecting terms, we obtain (17).
The formula for EB2p in (18) is obtained using an analogous derivation. Starting from
(30), we use the equation x = y
1+t
to write all the elasticities in terms of y. We then plug
in the formula for G under the second budget adjustment rule in (27). Finally, we use the
identity x =
(1+t)x
Z
"y;z
"cy;p
where "cy;p =
@yc
@p
1+t
yc
to collect terms and simplify the expression.
Derivation of Equation (20) for DWL(tjtS0 ) in General Case
Di¤erentiating (19) yields
@DWL(t)
@t
 (t)@EB
(t)
@t
+ i
@EBpi (t)
@t
+ 
@i
@t
[EBpi (t
S
0 )  EB(tS0 )] +
@Cg(t)
@t
(34)
Note that @Cg(t)
@t
= Gi(t)ifi(Gi) = Gi(t)
 @i
@t
. Hence
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@DWL(t)
@t
 (t)@EB
(t)
@t
+ i
@EBpi (t)
@t
+ 
@i
@t
[EBpi (t
S
0 )  EB(tS0 ) Gi(tS0 )]
Using equation (16), it follows that
EBpi (t) = EB
(t) +Gi(t)  t[xpi   x(t)].
Substituting this expression for EBpi (t) in (34), we obtain
@DWL(t)
@t
 (t)@EB
(t)
@t
+ i
@EBpi (t)
@t
  @i
@t
t[xpi   x(t)]
= (t)
@EB(t)
@t
+ i
@EBpi (t)
@t
+ ";tS [x
p   x(t)] (35)
where the last equality follows from the equi-proportionality assumption "i;t = "j ;t.
Under the approximation that compensated demand is linear in price, @x
c
@t
(x(tS0 )) is
constant, and it follows that @EB
(t)
@t
=
tS0
1+tS0
x0"
c
x;p (Browning 1987). To calculate
@EBp1 (t)
@t
,
note that we can write EBp1(t) =  12t2x(t)2( @x@Z )2=@x
c
@p
. Under the additional approximation
that demand is linear in income, @x
@Z
is constant, and it follows that
@EBp1(t
S
0 )
@t
= tS0 (1 + t
S
0 )x

0
x0
Z
x0
y0
y"x;z   (tS0 )2x0
x0
Z
x0
y0
y"x;z"x;p
where all the elasticities are evaluated at a price of 1 + tS0 . Similarly, note that EB
p
2(t) =
1
2
t2
1+t
x(t)2( @y
@Z
)2=@y
c
@p
. Using linear approximations for y(t; Z), we obtain
@EBp2(t
S
0 )
@t
=
tS0
1 + tS0
1 + 1
2
tS0
1 + tS0
x0
x0
Z
y0
x0
x"y;z  
(tS0 )
2
(1 + tS0 )
2
x0
x0
Z
y0
x0
x"y;z"x;p
Finally, plugging in the derivatives of EB(t) and EBpi (t) into (35), multiplying by t,
and factoring yields the expression for DWL(tjtS0 ) in (20).
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Treatment Store Control Store #1 Control Store #2
A. Store Characteristics
Mean Weekly Revenue ($) 307,297 268,193 375,114
Total Floor Space (sq ft) 41,609 34,187 37,251
Store Opening Year 1992 1992 1990
B. City Characteristics (in 1999)
Population 88,625 96,178 90,532
Median Age (years) 33.9 31.1 32.3
Median Household Income ($) 57,667 51,151 60,359
Mean Household Size 2.8 2.9 3.1
Percent bachelor's degree or higher 19.4 20.4 18.2
Percent Married 60.2 56.9 58.1
Percent White 72.1 56.2 65.3
Distance to Treatment Store (miles) 7.7 27.4
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics: Grocery Stores
Notes: Data on store characteristics obtained from grocery chain.  Weekly revenue statistics based on sales in calendar 
year 2005.  Data for city characteristics are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000.  Control stores were 
chosen using a least-squares minimum-distance criterion based on this set of variables.
Total
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control All Stores
Products Products Products Products Products Products and Products
A. Category Level Statistics:
Weekly quantity sold 25.08 26.63 24.88 28.45 30.80 32.83 29.01
per category (24.1) (38.1) (24.5) (41.5) (29.7) (51.9) (42.5)
Weekly revenue $97.85 $136.05 $93.26 $144.09 $120.81 $165.24 $143.10
per category (81.9) (169.9) (82.7) (187.9) (99.1) (225.3) (187.1)
Number of categories 13 95 13 95 13 95 108
B. Product Level Statistics
Pre-tax product price 4.46 6.26 4.37 6.30 4.64 6.32 6.05
(1.8) (4.3) (1.6) (4.4) (1.8) (4.1) (4.1)
Pre-tax product price 4.27 5.61 4.16 5.58 4.38 5.60 5.45
(weighted by quantity sold) (4.7) (3.9) (1.6) (3.9) (1.7) (3.7) (3.7)
Weekly quantity sold 1.47 1.82 1.58 1.95 1.63 2.01 1.88
per product (conditional >0) (0.9) (1.6) (1.0) (1.8) (1.1) (2.0) (1.7)
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics by Product Groups
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Statistics are based on sales between 2005 week 1 and 2006 week 15.  Data source is scanner data obtained from grocery 
chain.  "Treatment products" are the set of products for which tax-inclusive prices were shown in the experimental period; "control products" are unaffected products 
located near the treatment products.  See Appendix Table 1 for list of treatment and control categories.  Product price reflects actual price paid, including any discount if 
product is on sale.  See Appendix A for data sources and sample definition.  
Control Store #2Treatment Store Control Store #1
Period Difference
Baseline 26.48 25.17 -1.31
(2005:1- (0.22) (0.37) (0.43)
 2006:6) [5510] [754] [6264]
Experiment 27.32 23.87 -3.45
(2006: 8- (0.87) (1.02) (0.64)
 2006:10) [285] [39] [324]
Difference 0.84 -1.30 DDTS = -2.14
over time (0.75) (0.92) (0.64)
[5795] [793] [6588]
Period Difference
Baseline 30.57 27.94 -2.63
(2005:1- (0.24) (0.30) (0.32)
 2006:6) [11020] [1508] [12528]
Experiment 30.76 28.19 -2.57
(2006: 8- (0.72) (1.06) (1.09)
 2006:10) [570] [78] [648]
Difference 0.19 0.25 DDCS = 0.06
over time (0.64) (0.92) (0.90)
[11590] [1586] [13176]
DDD Estimate -2.20
(0.58)
[19764]
CONTROL STORES
Control Categories Treated Categories
Notes: Each cell shows mean number of units sold per category per week, for various subsets of 
the sample.  Standard errors (clustered by week) in parentheses, number of observations in square 
brackets.   Experimental period spans promotional week 8 in 2006 to promotional week 10 in 2006.  
Baseline period spans promotional week 1 in 2005 to promotional week 6 in 2006.  A promotional 
week is a standard calendar week begining on a Wednesday and ending the following Tuesday.  
See Appendix Table 1 for list of treatment and control categories.  Lower panel reflects averages 
across the two control stores.  
DDD Analysis of Means: Weekly Quantity by Category
TABLE 3
TREATMENT STORE
Control Categories Treated Categories
Dependent Variable:
Quantity per 
category
Quantity per 
category
Revenue per 
category ($)
Log quantity 
per category
Log revenue   
per category
Price paid per 
product ($)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -2.20 -2.20 -13.12 -0.101 -0.123 -0.102
(0.58)*** (0.59)*** (4.88)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.212)
Average Price -3.15 -3.24
(0.26)*** (1.74)*
Average Price Squared 0.05 0.06
(0.00)*** (0.03)**
Log Average Price -1.59 -0.39
(0.11)*** (0.11)***
Category, Store, Week FEs x x x x x
Sample size 19,764 19,764 19,764 18,827 18,827 18,827
TABLE 4
Effect of Posting Tax-Inclusive Prices: Regression Estimates
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by week, reported in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All 
columns report estimates of the linear regression model specified in equation (3). Quantity and revenue reflect total sales of products 
within a given category in a given promotional week in a given store.  Average price is a weighted average of the prices of the goods for 
sale in each category, using a fixed basket of goods (weighted by total quantity sold) over time.  In columns 4 and 5, observations are 
weighted by total quantity by category-store.  In column 6, dependent variable is the average price of products that sold in a given 
category, week, and store (weighted by total quantity sold as in the previous specifications).
Dependent variable: Quantity Per Category
Full Sample Treat. Categories Treat. Store
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment -2.27 -1.55 -2.61
(0.60)*** (0.35)*** (0.72)***
Before Treatment -0.21
(1.07)
After Treatment 0.20
(0.78)
Average Price -3.04 -15.06 -7.99
(0.25)*** (3.55)*** (0.81)***
Average Price Squared 0.05 1.24 0.12
(0.00)*** (0.34)*** (0.01)***
Category, Store, Week FEs x x x
N 21,060 2,379 6,588
TABLE 5
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by week, in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  Specification 1 includes "placebo" treatment variables (and their 
interactions) for the 3 week period before the experiment and the 3 week period after the 
experiment.  Specifications 2 and 3 report DD estimates.  Specification 2 restricts the sample to 
treatment categories only.  The "Treatment" variable is defined as the interaction between the 
treatment store dummy and treatment time dummy.  Specification 3 restricts to the sample to the 
treatment store only.  The "Treatment" variable is defined as the interaction between the treatment 
category dummy and the treatment time dummy.  All specifications include average price and its 
square and category, store, and promotional week fixed effects.  
Effect of Posting Tax-Inclusive Prices: Robustness Checks
State Beer Consumption (Gallons) 110,003
(120144)
State Per-Capita Beer Consumption (Cans/Pop.) 243.2
(46.1)
State Beer Excise Tax ($/case) 0.51
(0.50)
Federal Beer Excise Tax ($/case) 0.90
(0.03)
State Beer Excise Tax (Percent) 6.4
(8.2)
General Sales Tax (Percent) 4.3
(1.9)
State Drinking Age is 21 0.73
(0.44)
State has Drunk Driving Standard 0.66
(0.47)
Any Alcohol Regulation Change 0.19
(0.39)
N 1,690
TABLE 6
Descriptive Statistics for Alcohol Consumption, Taxes, and Regulation
Notes: Means; standard deviations in parentheses. "State Drinking Age is 21" is an indicator for state 
has raised the legal drinking age to 21; "State has Drunk Driving Standard" indicates state has set a 
threshold blood alcohol content level above which one is automatically guilty of drunk driving.  "Any 
Alcohol Regulation Change" is a dummy variable equal to one in any year where a state has raised the 
drinking age, implemented a stricter drunk driving standard, implemented an administrative license 
revocation law, or a zero tolerance youth drunk driving law.  See Appendix A for data sources and 
sample definition.
Dependent Variable: Change in Log(per capita beer consumption)
Baseline Bus Cycle Bus Cycle Lags Alc Regulations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΔLog(1+Excise Tax Rate) -0.87 -0.91 -0.86 -0.89
(0.17)*** (0.17)*** (0.17)*** (0.17)***
ΔLog(1+Sales Tax Rate) -0.20 -0.00 0.03 -0.02
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
ΔLog(Population) 0.03 -0.07 0.05 -0.07
(0.06) (0.07) (0.19) (0.07)
ΔLog(Income per Capita) 0.22 0.18 0.22
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)***
ΔLog(Unemployment Rate) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01)** (0.01) (0.01)**
Lag Bus. Cycle Controls x
Alcohol Regulation Controls x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x
F-Test for Equality of Tax 
Variables (Prob>F) 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sample Size 1607 1487 1440 1487
TABLE 7
Effect of Excise and Sales Taxes on Beer Consumption
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  All specifications include year fixed effects and log state population.  Column 2 controls for 
log state personal income per capita and log state unemployment rate (unavailable in some states in the early 
1970s).  Column 3 adds one year lags of personal income per capita and unemployment rate variables. Column 
4 controls for changes in alcohol policy by including three separate indicators for whether the state implemented 
per se drunk driving standards, administrative license revocation laws, or zero tolerance youth drunk driving 
laws, and the change in the minimum drinking age (measured in years).  
Dependent Variable: Change in Log(per capita beer consumption) Dep Var:
 Include Local 
Sales Taxes Region Trends
IV for Excise w/ 
Policy
3-Year 
Differences Food Exempt
Share Ethanol 
from Beer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ΔLog(1+Excise Tax Rate) -0.68 -0.71 -0.62 -1.11 -0.91 0.16
(0.24)*** (0.18)*** (0.28)** (0.46)** (0.22)*** (0.13)
ΔLog(1+Sales Tax Rate) 0.14 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 -0.14 0.25
(0.34) (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.22)
ΔLog(Population) -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 -1.30 0.03 0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.37)*** (0.07) (0.05)*
ΔLog(Income per Capita) 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.09 0.22 0.01
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.07) (0.05)*** (0.03)
ΔLog(Unemployment Rate) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.01)* (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Alcohol Regulation Controls x x x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x
F-Test for Equality of Tax 
Variables (Prob>F) 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.74
Sample Size 1104 1487 1487 1389 937 1487
TABLE 8
Effect of Excise and Sales Taxes on Beer Consumption
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by state, in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Column 1 replicates 
column 4 of Table 7, defining the sales tax rate as the state sales tax plus average local sales tax, imputed as described in the appendix.  
Column 2 reverts to the state sales tax measure and replicates column 4 of Table 7 including fixed effects for each of nine census regions. In 
column 3, excise tax rate changes are instrumented by the nominal excise tax rate divided by the average price of a case of beer from 1970 
to 2003, to eliminate variation in the tax rate due to inflation erosion. Column 4 shows estimates of the model with all variables defined using 
three-year differences instead of first-differences.  Column 5 restricts the sample to states where food was exempt from taxation in 2000 and 
replicates the first-difference specification.  In column 6, the dependent variable is the fraction of total ethanol consumption in each state-year 
accounted for by beer.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t0
E=0 t0
E=25%
tS G G ΔR DWL ΔR DWL
1% $0.50 $0.40 $100.00 $0 $79.20 $20.40
5% 12.50 10 500 0 380 110
10% 50 40 1000 0 720 240
20% 200 160 2000 0 1280 560
30% 450 360 3000 0 1680 960
TABLE 9
Individual vs. Social Welfare with Quasilinear Utility
Notes: Calibrations assume that utility is quasilinear in y,  x0=10,000, ε
0
x,p=1.  Column 1 assumes no 
pre-existing taxes; columns 2-6 assume a pre-existing excise tax of t0
E=0.25.    Column 1 shows 
individual utility gain from computing tax-inclusive price when a sales tax at rate tS is introduced.  
Column 2 shows the same when there is a pre-existing excise tax of 25%.  Column 3 shows the 
revenue obtained from the sales tax when agent is inattentive and does not change demand in 
response to sales tax.  Column 4 shows deadweight loss for this agent. Columns 5 and 6 show 
revenue obtained from the sales tax and deadweight loss when agent is attentive and re-optimizes 
in response to the tax.
θ = 0              θ = 1
Categories Group Description Category Description Mean Weekly Revenue
Treatment
5101 Deodorant Aerosols 82.40
5103 Deodorant Body Sprays 55.22
5105 Deodorant Roll-ons 44.12
5110 Deodorant Clear Solids 323.38
5115 Deodorant Clear Soft 35.13
5120 Deodorant Clear 123.48
5125 Deodorant Visible Sticks 75.57
5245 Hair Care Accessories 189.47
5501 Cosmetics Facial 84.20
5505 Cosmetics Eye 195.00
5510 Cosmetics Nail 73.38
5515 Cosmetics Lipstick 48.39
5520 Cosmetics Accessories 19.37
Control
5005 Oral Hygiene At Home Whitening 107.24
5010 Oral Hygiene Manual Toothbrush 340.57
5012 Oral Hygiene Power Toothbrush 120.89
5015 Oral Hygiene Oral Rinse/Mouthwash 314.75
5020 Oral Hygiene Denture Care 96.82
5025 Oral Hygiene Dental Floss Products 116.75
5030 Oral Hygiene Interdental Implements 26.76
5035 Oral Hygiene Oral Analgesics 115.45
5040 Oral Hygiene Portable Oral Care 52.84
5201 Hair Care Professional Daily Hair Care 310.75
5205 Hair Care Performance Daily Hair Care 983.31
5210 Hair Care Value Daily Hair Care 290.11
5215 Hair Care Dandruff Hair Care 116.37
5220 Hair Care Therapeutic Hair Care 20.54
5225 Hair Care Hair Growth 12.85
5230 Hair Care Kids Hair Care 46.75
5235 Hair Care Hair Color 430.18
5250 Hair Care African American Hair Care 59.91
5301 Skin Care Bar Soap 395.65
5305 Skin Care Liquid Hand Soap 138.95
5308 Skin Care Liquid Waterless Sanitizer 41.00
5310 Skin Care Body Wash 339.04
5312 Skin Care Bath Care 29.82
5314 Skin Care Image Bath Boutique 36.07
5315 Skin Care Acne Prevention 140.02
5318 Skin Care Acne Treatment 12.57
5320 Skin Care Basic Facial Care 427.17
5322 Skin Care Anti-aging/Treatments skin care 27.99
5325 Skin Care Hand & Body Skin Care 312.46
5330 Skin Care Lip Care 91.97
5335 Skin Care Cotton 169.72
APPENDIX TABLE 1
Category Classification in Grocery Store Data
5340 Skin Care Depilatories 33.61
5345 Skin Care Adult Skin Care 172.57
5350 Skin Care Child/Baby Sun Care 26.06
5401 Shave Needs/Men's Personal Care Razors 161.13
5405 Shave Needs/Men's Personal Care Cartridges 389.02
5410 Shave Needs/Men's Personal Care Disposable Razors 195.95
5415 Shave Needs/Men's Personal Care Shave Preps 210.23
5420 Shave Needs/Men's Personal Care Men's Skin Care 14.98
5601 Vitamins and Dietary Supplements Multiple Vitamins 264.95
5605 Vitamins and Dietary Supplements Joint Relief 89.57
5610 Vitamins and Dietary Supplements Calcium 72.59
5615 Vitamins and Dietary Supplements Letters 120.32
5620 Vitamins and Dietary Supplements Specialty Supplements 65.91
5625 Vitamins and Dietary Supplements A/O Minerals 31.65
5630 Vitamins and Dietary Supplements Herbal Supplements 74.18
5701 Pain Relief Adult Aspirin 48.23
5703 Pain Relief  Enteric/Antacid/Buffered Aspirin 14.90
5704 Pain Relief Low Strength Aspirin 62.19
5705 Pain Relief   Adult Acetaminophen 203.24
5710 Pain Relief Ibuprofen Adult 252.89
5715 Pain Relief Naproxen Sodium 54.63
5716 Pain Relief Adult Compounds 86.75
5718 Pain Relief Specialty Indication Pain 88.92
5725 Pain Relief Children's/Infants Analgesics 187.25
5730 Pain Relief Sleeping Aids 64.99
5735 Pain Relief Stimulants 14.82
5750 Pain Relief Nighttime Pain Relief 76.19
5760 Pain Relief External Analgesic 144.08
5799 Pain Relief GM/HBC Trial Size 66.88
5801 Respiratory  Pediatric Cold/Flu/Cough/Allergy/Sinus 229.73
5805 Respiratory Adult Cough, Cold, Flu 925.93
5835 Respiratory Adult Allergy/Sinus 500.74
5840 Respiratory Nasal Products 269.19
5845 Respiratory Bronchial Asthma 41.45
5850 Respiratory Cough Drops/Throat Relief 252.64
5855 Respiratory Thermometers/Covers 37.72
5901 Digestive Health Acid Neutralizers 243.37
5905 Digestive Health Acid Combination 17.21
5910 Digestive Health Acid Blockers 131.62
5915 Digestive Health Proton Pump Inhibitors (PPI) 92.82
5920 Digestive Health Multi Symptom Gastro Intestinal Relief 70.60
5925 Digestive Health Gas Relief 49.46
5930 Digestive Health Motion Sickness/Anti-Nausea 24.32
5935 Digestive Health  Anti-diarrhea 82.70
5940 Digestive Health Laxatives 265.29
5945 Digestive Health Lactose Intolerance 22.14
5950 Digestive Health Rectal/Hemmorhoidal 58.79
5955 Digestive Health Pediatric Laxatives 31.57
6001 Eye/Ear Care Soft Contact Lens Care 155.16
6005 Eye/Ear Care Rigid Gas Permeable Contact Lens Care 18.55
6010 Eye/Ear Care General Eye Care 203.62
6040 Eye/Ear Care Reading Glasses 71.66
6042 Eye/Ear Care Sunglasses 43.87
6045 Eye/Ear Care  Misc. Eye Glass Accessories 15.28
6050 Eye/Ear Care Ear Care/Ear Plugs 33.25
6101 Foot Care Insoles/Inserts 75.90
6105 Foot Care Corns/Callous/Padding/Bunion/Blister 28.88
6110 Foot Care Odor/Wetness Control 19.64
6115 Foot Care Anti-Fungal/Athlete's Foot 107.49
6120 Foot Care Jock Itch 20.22
6130 Foot Care Wart Removers 37.76
6190 Foot Care  Grooming and Misc. Foot Care 12.70
Note: Weekly revenue statistics based on sales in calendar year 2005.
Figure 1a
Distribution of Placebo Estimates: Log Revenue
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Figure 1b
Distribution of Placebo Estimates: Log Quantity
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NOTE– These figures plot the empirical distributions of placebo effects (G for log
revenue and quantity. The CDFs are constructed from 4,725 estimates of δP using the
specifications in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4. No parametric smoothing is applied: the
CDFs appear smooth because of the large number of points used to construct them.
The vertical lines show the treatment effect estimates reported in Table 4.
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Figure 3a
Number of Correctly Reported Taxed Items on Survey
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Figure 3b
Fraction Incorrect by Product on Survey
NOTE–Figure 3a is a histogram of the number of products whose tax status was
correctly identified by survey respondents. Figure 3b plots the fraction of incorrect
answers regarding tax status by product category.
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Perceived budget line: 
slope = -p
Actual budget line:
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Figure 4
Three Budget Adjustment Rules
NOTE–This figure illustrates three ways in which an agent who ignores the tax on good
x can reach a feasible allocation given his true budget constraint. The agent’s initial
(infeasible) allocation under his perceived budget constraint is given by x ′, y ′. Under
the first budget adjustment rule, the agent cuts consumption of y to meet his budget,
leading to the choice x1, y1. Under the second budget adjustment rule, the agent
cuts consumption of x, leading to x2, y2. Under the third rule, the agent cuts
consumption of both goods, and chooses a point that is optimal when his budget set is
shifted inward to match his true net-of-tax income at the chosen allocation x3, y3.
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Figure 5a
Cost of Ignoring Tax with Quasilinear Utility
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Figure 5b
Efficiency Cost of Taxation with Quasilinear Utility
C B
NOTE–In Figure 5a, region A depicts individual utility loss (G) from ignoring the sales
tax. In Figure 5b, region A depicts individual utility loss from ignoring a new sales tax
Δt when there is already an excise tax of t0E included in the posted price. Region
A+B+C (shaded rectangle) depicts change in government revenue (ΔRθ = 0)) when
the individual does not respond to the introduction of the sales tax. Regions B+D
(trapezoid) represent excess burden when the individual does respond to the tax
change (EB∗Δt).
EXHIBIT 1
Tax-Inclusive Price Tags
Orig.
Tag
Exp.
Tag
EXHIBIT 2: TAX SURVEY 
University of California, Berkeley 
Department of Economics 
 
This survey is part of a project about taxes being conducted by researchers at UC Berkeley. Your identity will be kept strictly 
confidential and will not be used in the research. If you have any questions about your rights or treatment as a participant in this 
research project, please contact UC-Berkeley’s Committee for Protection of Human Subjects at (510) 642-7461, or e-mail: 
subjects@berkeley.edu.  
 
 
Gender: 
F Male  
F Female 
Age:  
 
Marital Status:  
F Married  
F Unmarried 
Education: F High School  
                    F College Degree  
                    F Graduate Degree 
Years You Have Lived in 
California: 
 
Is tax added at the register (in addition to the price 
posted on the shelf) for each of the following items?  
 
                   
 milk              Y   N               toothpaste                Y   N 
  
 magazines     Y   N soda                         Y   N 
 
 beer               Y   N               cookies                    Y   N  
 
 potatoes        Y   N               cigarettes                 Y   N 
Have you purchased these items within the last 
month?   
 
              
 milk               Y   N                toothpaste          Y   N 
  
 magazines     Y   N                soda                   Y   N 
 
 beer               Y   N            cookies               Y   N  
 
 potatoes         Y   N                cigarettes           Y   N 
 
 
 What is the sales tax rate in [city]?      ___________% 
 
 What is the California state income tax rate in the highest tax bracket?     _____________ % 
 
 What percentage of families in the US do you think pay the federal estate tax when someone dies? 
 
< 2%                    2-10%                    10-25%                    25-50%                    > 50% 
 
 
  Thank you for your time! 
 
